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The second essay studies the impact of power company mergers on fuel sourcing decisions. Specifically, I
study whether coal-fired power plants consolidate their supplier base upon a merger. I find that a pair of two
merging plants becomes 23% more likely to source from common suppliers. Plant pairs also increase their
dependence on the common suppliers. I find that a fraction of total coal delivery from the common suppliers
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Jin Soo Han
Jean-François Houde
This dissertation consists of two essays on the U.S. electricity sector.
The first essay studies the impact of electricity market deregulation on a firm’s
fuel procurement costs. I find that deregulated coal-fired power plants achieve
about 6% cost reduction, half of what literature has claimed. Furthermore, when
the Acid Rain Program, environmental regulation on sulfur dioxide, induces dereg-
ulated plants to disproportionately switch to cleaner and cheaper sub-bituminous
coal, it is challenging to identify what cost reductions would have been absent
the environmental regulation. I estimate 3% as the lower bound effect of deregu-
lation. Despite the small effect on average, plants exhibit heterogenous reponses
to deregulation. When plants procure coal via bilateral contracts, an amount of
cost reductions a plant can attain depends on its incentive and ability to negotiate.
I find that deregulated plants with unfavorable contracts and bigger production
capacity achieve substantial cost reductions; 18% and 9%, respectively.
The second essay studies the impact of power company mergers on fuel sourc-
ing decisions. Specifically, I study whether coal-fired power plants consolidate
their supplier base upon a merger. I find that a pair of two merging plants becomes
vi
23% more likely to source from common suppliers. Plant pairs also increase their
dependence on the common suppliers. I find that a fraction of total coal delivery
from the common suppliers increases by 47% upon a merger.
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Chapter 1
Deregulation and Input Costs:
Revisiting the Case of the U.S.
Electricity Market
1.1 Introduction
In the late 1990’s, the U.S electricity industry was sailing through a storm of reg-
ulatory changes. Cost-of-service regulation was repealed in many states based on
an intellectual premise that market competition improves efficiency. One of the
ideas behind the promised efficiency gain was that plants would face increased
incentives to reduce their input costs once they become residual claimants to cost
savings in a deregulated market.2 However, the cost-minimization incentives were
not completely absent under the traditional regulation.3 Many state regulators had
modified their fuel cost pass-through programs such that firms “absorb a portion
2Under cost-of-service regulation, regulated utilities recover their fuel expenditure as long as
state regulators approve the expenditure to be prudent.
3See Abito (2016) for a survey of other incentives that utilities have under rate-of-return regula-
tion.
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of fuel cost overruns as well as profit from lower than expected fuel costs” (Knittel,
2002a). To that end, the effectiveness of deregulation has remained as an empirical
question until Cicala (2015) has provided the first evidence that deregulation leads
to, on average, 12% fuel cost reductions.
However, the average effect is nuanced in that it can mask the general efficacy
of treatment when the distribution of the effect is skewed. When power plants
typically procure coal via bilateral contracts, it is unlikely that all the plants are
able to leverage deregulation to achieve unilateral cost reductions. In this paper,
I show that deregulation indeed has a heterogeneous effect across different plants
depending on their incentive and ability to negotiate contracts.
But first, I replicate Cicala’s finding and show that his results are heavily in-
fluenced by a subset of the plants treated by an event unrelated to deregulation. I
employ the same matched difference-in-difference estimation where power plants
that are divested by regulated utilities (as a mandatory compliance for deregula-
tion) are compared to the plants that never become divested. The key assumption
of the methodology is that divested plants would not have behaved differentially
from non-divested plants absent the treatment. The fuel costs delivered to the
plants owned by Commonwealth Edison Co. (7 of the 88 divested plants), how-
ever, started to decline in the early 90’s prior to their divestitures in the late 90’s.
Albeit an effort to reduce costs, the company’s contract re-negotiation was not a re-
sponse to increase cost competitiveness in a deregulated market.4 Nonetheless, the
adjusted contract continued to lower delivered coal prices to the company’s plants
post divestiture. Then, including the ComEd plants in the econometric analysis
inflates the average treatment effect. When rather the anomalous plants are ex-
4Commonwealth Edison’s re-negotiation predates Illinois market deregulation by about five
years.
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cluded, the average effect becomes 6% and statistically indistinguishable from 0.
I then claim that the revised effect is further confounded by an environmental
regulation, the Acid Rain Program (ARP). The introduction of an emissions cap
on sulfur dioxides (SO2) has incentivized regulated plants to comply by installing
capital-intensive abatement equipment (also known as the Averch-Johnson effect
(1962)). In comparison, divested plants have been much more likely to switch to
low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal. Unfortunately, sub-bituminous coal have been
not only cleaner but also cheaper. By switching coal types, divested plants could
not only comply with the environmental regulation but also earn a windfall drop
in fuel costs. However, because the implementation of the ARP coincides with
that of market deregulation, it is hard to separately identify cost reductions due to
respective policy changes.
Conditional on burning the same type of coal, divestiture leads to about 3%
cost reductions. The rest of the total 6% cost reductions is then attributed to coal-
switching. This does not grant that the ARP alone explains all the fuel-switching.
Absent the market deregulation, more plants would have remained rate-regulated
and therefore would have adopted scrubbers, resulting in less coal-switching. How-
ever, vice versa is also true: absent the environmental regulation, divested plants
would have switched less. Focusing on the plants that had installed scrubbers
before the ARP and hence face minimal levels of compliance, I find that divested
plants switch coal types just as much as non-divested plants. Depending on the ex-
tent to which the ARP influences coal-switching, the average effect of divestiture
would range from 3%˜6%.
The overall insignificant effect of divestiture, however, does not mean that
deregulation was a failure altogether. When 81 divested plants spend about $5 bil-
lion annually, 3%˜6% cost reductions are economically important numbers as they
3
translate into $150˜$300 million annual savings. Moreover, deregulation was effec-
tive for certain type of plants. In fact, when power plants procure coal via bilateral
long-term contracts, an amount of cost reductions a plant can realize hinges on its
incentive and/or ability to negotiate the contract terms. First, I observe that plants
with contracts that charge about the market price would not gain much from re-
negotiation. In contrast, plants stuck in unfavorably high cost contracts could seize
divestiture as an opportunity to bargain better terms (Joskow, 1988). Empirically,
cost reductions for divested plants with the pre-treatment contract costs one stan-
dard deviation (38%) higher than their neighbors’ are 21 percentage point more
than those for the divested plants with no such cost disadvantage. Second, litera-
ture on countervailing power predicts that bigger buyers often extract larger con-
cessions from suppliers.5 I find that cost reductions for divested plants with pro-
duction capacity one-standard-deviation (730 megawatts) bigger than the average
are 12 percentage point more than those for the divested plants with the average
capacity. Heterogeneity in the treatment effect suggests that successful deregula-
tion does not depend solely on a plant’s cost-minimization incentives. Rather, it
requires an understanding of an intricate interaction between the power producers
and the coal suppliers.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section 1.2 briefly docu-
ments the history of electricity market deregulation in the U.S., and explains why
plant divestitures take place in certain states but not in others, providing a natural
experiment research design. In Section 1.3, I explain the research design and test
the validity of the estimation strategy in the data. In Section 1.4, I revisit and dis-
cuss Cicala’s findings. Section 1.5 documents the role of the Clean Air Act Amend-
5See Section 1.6 for theoretical explanations that a plant’s size is associated with better bargain-
ing leverage.
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ments in explaining the cost reductions by the divested plants. In Section 1.6, I
explore heterogeneity in the treatment effect and provide evidence that deregula-
tion was effective for certain type of plants.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to two bodies of literature. First, the paper contributes to
the empirical literature on the consequences of the U.S. electricity market deregu-
lation.6 An important departure of my paper is that I consider a role of bilateral
contracts in explaining different plants’ heterogeneous responses to the market
deregulation.
Researchers have so far examined deregulation’s impact on the wholesale mar-
ket performance (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002;
Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008; Hortacsu and Puller, 2008), emissions com-
pliance on SO2 (Fowlie, 2010), consumer choices in retail competition (Hortacsu,
Madanizadeh and Puller, 2012), investment decisions by plant operators (Ishii and
Yan, 2002), and safety of nuclear power plants (Hausman, 2014). This paper closely
relates to studies that examine the aspects of operating performance (i.e., fuel ef-
ficiency, plant utilization rates, non-fuel operating expenses, etc.) of the power
plants (Kleit and Terrell, 2001; Wolfram, 2005; Douglas, 2006; Fabrizio, Rose and
Wolfram, 2007; Zhang, 2007; Davis and Wolfram, 2012; Chan et al., 2013; Craig and
Savage, 2013). Yet, unlike the previous studies, this paper focuses its attention to
the largest portion of the operating expenses, fuel procurement costs. Though Ci-
cala (2015) is the first to provide an evidence of fuel cost reductions from market
deregulation, I further explore how a plant’s incentive and ability to negotiate its
6Researchers have examined electricity market deregulation in other countries as well. Selected
papers include Newbery and Pollitt (1997); Wolfram (1999); Cropper et al. (2011).
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procurement contracts shape its response to market deregulation.
Second, the paper touches upon the empirical bargaining literature on how a
firm size affects negotiated prices between the firm and its suppliers (i.e., counter-
vailing power literature). Since Galbraith (1954) introduced the concept of coun-
tervailing power, a number of theoretical papers have predicted that an agent of a
bigger size can extract more concessions from its bargaining counter-party (Horn
and Wolinsky, 1988; Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; Chipty and Snyder, 1999). However,
empirical studies have been mostly limited to applications in the health care indus-
try (Sorensen, 2003; Ho, 2009; Ellison and Snyder, 2010; Lakdawalla and Yin, 2015).
This paper brings the theoretical prediction of countervailing power to the trans-
actions between power plants and coal mines and shows that when deregulation
provides plants an opportunity to re-negotiate, a plant size matters in negotiating
a lower price with the suppliers.
1.2 Institutional Background
In order to examine the impact of deregulation on fuel costs, this study relies on a
natural experiment in the U.S electricity sector that took place in the late 1990’s.7
Historically, a vertically integrated power utility owned and operated production
and distribution of electricity in a regional market. A state regulator often imposed
rate-of-return regulation to these local monopolies in order to protect consumers
from the potential abuse of market power. The rate-based regulation typically sets
a rate at which power utilities earn profits based on capital, and reimburses any
prudent operating costs (hence the other name, cost-of-service regulation). Yet
over time, the efficiency of cost-of-service regulation and local monopolies was
7See Joskow (1997) and Griffin and Puller (2009) for the details of the history of the U.S electricity
sector deregulation.
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called into question as local electricity markets could be integrated over a greater
region.
In the mid 90’s, the federal government started an initiative to make the electric-
ity sector more competitive.8 The idea was to introduce competition in the genera-
tion segment of the electricity sector by splitting generation from transmission and
distribution. Although actual implementation was up to states’ discretion, most
states seemed interested in the idea of deregulation. All states at least considered
the prospects by 1998 (Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram, 2007).
The deregulation momentum, however, dissipated quickly in the summer of
2000 as the California electricity crisis broke out. Many states stopped considering
deregulation, and a handful that had already begun the restructuring process sus-
pended further action. Meanwhile, the states that had already finished or that had
made a far enough progress in the process did not reverse back to the regulation
(Griffin and Puller, 2009; Borenstein, 2002). In such states, generation facilities of
regulated utilities were required to be divested.9 Once divested, a plant’s operat-
ing costs were no longer subject to rate regulation as it competed in a deregulated
wholesale market. Plants in all other non-deregulated states remained under the
status quo cost-of-service regulation. Many researchers have exploited this natu-
ral experiment that some plants undergo divestiture while others remain regulated
as an empirical research design (Bushnell and Wolfram, 2005; Wolfram, 2005; Dou-
8The Energy Policy Act (EPACT) in 1992 and a series of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) orders following the EPACT laid a legal ground for restructuring. In 1992, the FERC issued
Order No. 636, known as the Restructuring Rule, which mandated open access to the transmission
system and separation of electricity sales from transportation services. The FERC also mandated
non-discriminatory pricing and access to transmission services –Order No.888 in 1996–, and estab-
lished legal grounds for voluntary, non-profit organizations –Order No. 2000 in 1999– that would
manage the wholesale electricity markets.
9Utilities were allowed to transfer their generation assets to unregulated affiliates. That is, one
umbrella parent company could own both the generation facilities and the regulated transmis-
sion/distribution facilities. But, the generation facilities had to operate independently from the
transmission/distribution facilities.
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glas, 2006; Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram, 2007; Davis and Wolfram, 2012; Chan et al.,
2013; Craig and Savage, 2013; Hausman, 2014; Cicala, 2015). This paper adopts a
similar strategy and explores the differences in fuel procurement costs between the
divested plants and the non-divested plants.10
However, researchers have also cautioned against a potential selection bias of
this estimation strategy. States with high electricity prices were more likely to
deregulate (White, Joskow and Hausman, 1996). If the high prices were driven by
expensive coal procurement costs, one could argue that cost reductions by high-
cost deregulated plants were simply the mean reversions. Fortunately, the high
electricity prices were mostly due to the high construction costs of nuclear plants
(White, Joskow and Hausman, 1996; Davis and Wolfram, 2012; Chan et al., 2013).
Rate-of-return regulation incorporated construction costs in the electricity prices
as the prices were set based on the capital investment. Although it is impossible to
completely eliminate the identification concern, there is no evidence, at least to my
knowledge, that restructuring decisions of the states depended on the performance
of coal-fired power plants.
1.3 Methodology & Data
1.3.1 Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimator
In this paper, I employ the same matched differences-in-differences (DiD) estima-
tor as in Cicala (2015).11 The treatment group consists of divested plants in deregu-
lated states while the control group consists of regulated plants that remain under
10Technically, the set of regulated plants also includes plants that are never subject to divestiture
as they are owned by the government, municipalities or local cooperative organizations.
11The matched DiD approach is similar to Heckman et al. (1998). Matching is implemented on
the actual characteristics of facilities rather than the propensity score as in Cicala.
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the status quo cost-of-service regulation. The outcome variable is overall deliv-
ered coal prices, which represent the total costs of fuel procurement and shipping.
However, the econometrician does not separately observe the individual compo-
nents of the delivered coal prices while she wants to estimate the impact of dereg-
ulation only on the procurement costs. Then, a classic endogeneity problem arises.
Matching plants in close proximity (proxy for shipping destination) that burn the
same type of coal (proxy for shipping origin) solves the problem. It allows to com-
pare plants that share the same shipping costs and more generally the same fuel
procurement environment such as the number of potential coal suppliers to a re-
gion.12
In practice, two criteria are used for matching: 1) geographic proximity of and
2) the type (rank) of coal burned at the plants. First, the geographic proximity is
defined to be either the m closest neighbors or plants within the caliper distance d.
A number of choices (i.e., 10, 5, 1 nearest neighbors and the control plants within
200, 100, 50 miles) are tested but the 200 mile distance threshold and the 10 nearest
neighbor specification are reported as a main specification throughout the paper.
The majority type of coal burned at the plant in 1997 is used for the definition
of plant’s coal type. Coal type can be bituminous, sub-bituminous or other. The
“other” category represents less than 3% of the data.13
12It is true that endogenous shipping costs become less of a problem if they are time-invariant
for each plant or time-varying but uniformly across plants such that plant or time fixed effects can
absorb the variation in the delivered prices due to shipping. But, the ’Coal Transportation: Rates
and Trends’ by the EIA (2004) documents that shipping costs of coal from a particular basin to
different regions of the country have varied differentially over time. Busse and Keohane (2007)
also show that shipping costs of sub-bituminous coal from the Powder River Basin varies across
regions over time. Then, unless divested plants and non-divested plants are located nearby and use
the same type of coal, it becomes infeasible to determine whether the post-treatment differences
in the coal prices between the two comparison groups reflect the pre-existing differences in the
shipping costs or the actual differences in the fuel procurement costs.
13The theoretical problem with the plant type definition based on 1997 is that the definition cat-
egorizes plants that switch their coal type in different years into the same plant type. Because of
the Phase I of the Clean Air Act, some plants switch from bituminous to cleaner sub-bituminous
9
Given the working definitions of matching criteria, a matched DiD is carried
out in two stages. The first stage identifies a set of matches from the control group
according to the matching criteria, which in our setting are proximity and rank of
coal burned at the plant. In the second stage, weighted averages of the outcome
variable are constructed by the treatment and the control group before and after
treatment. A DiD estimator is then calculated in a standard way. This matched DiD
can also be carried out in a regression setting with appropriate matching criteria
and weights.
Formal definitions of the matching criteria and the estimation equation are de-
noted in the following way. Let i denote a plant and t denote the time period. Let
K be the set of all the potential control facilities (i.e. a set of plants minus the di-
vested plants). First, a set of plants is identified as the matched control group. For
a particular treated facility k, a set of control plant j’s that satisfies
∑
j∈K
1(||distkj|| ≤ ||distkj′ ||) = m
||distkj|| < d
where ||distkj|| denotes the distance between j and k, respectively identifies the
m nearest plants and the plants within the caliper distance d of the plant k. The
equation rank j = rankk identifies the control plants that burn the same rank of
coal as the treated plant k. Given the set of treatment plants and the matched
counterpart, the average treatment effect on the treated can be estimated by the
coal in 1995. While these plants are categorized as the sub-bituminous plant, they exhibit differen-
tial trends in fuel costs from the plants that always burn sub-bituminous coal in the pre-treatment
period. To that end, I adjust the definition by assigning plants to a particular rank only if the same
rank coal is burned in all the years from 1990 to 1997. Plants that switch their coal type in any year
before 1997 are classified into the “other” category. Empirically, this leads to minor changes in the
estimated coefficients and does not overturn the results in Cicala.
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following regression equation:
log(pit) = β1(divest)it + γi + δt + εit (1.3.1)
where pit denotes the delivered coal prices, γi denotes the plant fixed effects, δt de-
notes the time (year-month) fixed effects, and 1(divest)it denotes a dummy equal
to 1 if the plant i is treated and t is after the treatment period. Given Equation
1.3.1, the matched DiD estimator can be estimated if each matched control plant is
weighted by the inverse of the number of matches to a treated plant. Intuitively,
for each treated plant, the inverse weighting constructs one synthetic control plant
from the pool of the matched control plants. Note that, Equation 1.3.1 is an un-
weighted unmatched OLS DiD estimation if one drops the first stage matching
and the weighting procedure. If one allows time fixed effects to differ flexibly
across regions, the OLS DiD could also account for the unobserved time-varying
differences across regions.14
1.3.2 Data
Comprehensive data used in this paper is constructed by merging three databases
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). EIA’s form 923, form 860 and
form 906 provide information on a plant’s fuel expenditure, characteristics, and
14It is important to keep in mind that subjective matching criteria assign somewhat arbitrary
weights to the matched control plants. In general, the matched DiD estimation has the weights sum
to 2*(# of divested plants) in each period t where t is typically 0 or 1. For each treated plant, a num-
ber of matched control plants are averaged to construct one synthetic counterpart. In other words,
from the perspective of control plants, a greater weight is assigned to the plant if it is matched to
multiple divested plants. That is, a control plant receives different weights depending on which
matching criteria are imposed. Although the empirical results are not sensitive to the choice of
cutoff, matching does load greater weights to a particular set of control plants. Because one might
worry that the estimation results are cherry-picked from over-weighting certain control plants, the
unmatched, unweighted (OLS) DiD estimation is performed to confirm the matched DiD results.
See Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2012) for detailed explanations on the weighting proce-
dure.
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divestiture status, respectively. One critical caveat of the data is that a part of the
fuel expenditure data is missing for the divested plants. Regulated plants upon
divestiture were no longer required to report until 2002 when the EIA resumed
collecting the data. Because most divested plants were sold off between 1999 and
2001, they have two years of missing data on average. This affects the interpreta-
tion of the DiD estimator. The estimator measures the differences in the outcome
variable before and two-year-after the treatment as opposed to before and after.
The short-term effects of less than two years can only be identified from a set of
plants that become divested post 2002.
The locations of coal-fired power plants in the U.S. are plotted in Figure 1.3.1 by
the eventual divestiture status. Note that most of the Northeast states are dereg-
ulated and the number of regulated plants in the region is small. The analysis in-
cludes fewer plants as one imposes more strict matching criterion on geographical
proximity.
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Figure 1.3.1: Coal-fired Plants in the United States, 1990-2009
Legend
Divested plants
Non-divested plants
Matched non-divested plants
Deregulated states
Notes: Plants that exit before 1997, enter after 2002, and cease reporting after 2002 are not
shown on the map. Matching criterion: d = 200 mi.
1.3.3 Validity of the DiD estimator: Graphical Analysis
Since the DiD estimation relies on comparing changes between the treatment and
the control plants, it is important to examine whether the control plants could serve
as a reasonable counterfactual for the treatment plants. Table 1.1 summarizes the
number of total and matched non-divested plants according to various matching
criteria.
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Table 1.1: Plant Typology
Matched Matched Total
Divested non-divested* non-divested** non-divested
Bituminous 66 57 108 190
Sub-bituminous 10 16 16 69
Other 12 13 13 48
Total 88 86 137 305
Notes: * indicates the 10 nearest neighbor matching. ** indicates the 200 mi. caliper distance match-
ing. Coal rank is based on the years from 1990 to 1997.
Given the matched non-divested plants, I compare divested plants and their
matched counterparts for 1) parallel pre-trends of the outcome variable and 2)
a balance in the observable characteristics in the pre-period. Panel (a) of Figure
1.3.2 shows the pre-trends between the divested and the matched non-divested
plants. Panel (b) of Figure 1.3.2 emphasizes the difference in the delivered coal
prices between the two comparison groups. Although the pre-trends seem some-
what parallel at the first glance, a closer look at the difference reveals that there
is a slight narrowing of the gap around 1993. Formally, I perform two hypothesis
tests with two respective nulls, H0 : δdivested plants = δmatched non-divested plants and
H0 : γdivested plants = γmatched non-divested plants, where δ and γ are defined in the
following equation:
log(pit) = γl + δlt + εit
t indicates a monthly time variable from January 1990 to December 1997, i denotes
a plant, and l denotes either a group of divested plants or that of non-divested
plants. Intuitively, δl and γl are a linear time trend and the average coal costs in log
for the group l. The Wald tests on the respective null hypotheses provide p-values
of 0.042 and 0.011, implying that at the 5% significant level the pre-trend and the
14
mean fuel costs of divested plants are different from those of the non-divested
plants.15 Though one might argue that the 5% significance level is insufficient to
rule out the possibility of parallel pre-trends, it is important to remember that the
analysis is performed on the matched sample. Differential averages and trends of
the delivered costs at the two comparison groups imply that divested plants and
nearby non-divested plants differ fundamentally beyond the shipping costs.
Figure 1.3.2: Pre-trends in Delivered Coal Prices
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(c) Levels, ComEd partitioned
Notes: The 10 nearest neighbor matching is used. Coal rank is based on the years from 1990 to 1997.
Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the number
of matches to j. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the plant level.
15The p-values in the text are estimated using the 200 mi distance caliper distance matching. The
10 nearest neighbor matching yields the p-values of 0.059 and 0.016 for testing the differences in
the time trend and the mean fuel costs, respectively.
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1.3.4 Validity as Treatment Group: 7 ComEd Plants in Chicago
In this subsection, I document that the fuel cost reductions by the seven Com-
monwealth Edison Co. (ComEd) plants were triggered by re-negotiation of old
contracts but not by divestiture. Once the ComEd plants are excluded from the
sample, the parallel pre-trends are restored, the average coal prices at the divested
plants are no longer different from those at the non-divested plants.
The story of ComEd’s contract re-negotiation dates back to the 1970’s. Begin-
ning in the 70’s, Chicago mandated that power utilities burn cleaner coal as part of
compliance with the Clean Air Act (the very initial one enacted in 1973). Like other
utilities, ComEd substituted away from high-sulfur bituminous coal to low-sulfur
sub-bituminous coal produced in Montana and Wyoming. It entered into over 30-
year contracts that were to last until the early 2000’s. The terms of contracts were
such that the delivered coal prices were to gradually escalate over time based on a
predetermined rate.16 The contracts were reasonable given the energy crisis in the
70’s. But in the following decade, the coal sector grew remarkably in Montana and
Wyoming, and by the mid 80’s, sub-bituminous coal from the region had become
substantially cheaper.
Facing much more competitive market prices, many utilities that had entered
into long-term contracts in the 70’s either re-negotiated or bought out their old con-
tracts in the 80’s. However, ComEd failed to do so. After several failed attempts
to buy out its old contracts, the company tried to cut the deliveries from what it
had contracted for. As ComEd lost a lawsuit filed by the coal suppliers for breach-
ing the contracts, it had to resume its expensive coal deliveries. By the early 90’s,
ComEd was paying about twice above the market price for its coal. In 1992, the
16See Decker Coal Co. v Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, Decker Coal Co. v Department
of Revenue of the State of Montana & The State Tax Appeal Board of the State of Montana, No. 99-
078. and the 10-K form of ComEd (1993) for the detailed history of ComEd’s coal contracts.
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City of Chicago, the state’s attorney’s office and the state’s Office of Public Coun-
sel filed an official complaint to the Illinois Commerce Commission (abbr., ICC,
i.e., Illinois Public Utility Commission) to audit ComEd’s rate case. Pressured by
accentuated media coverage, ComEd soon reached a settlement with the ICC for
refunds and re-negotiated its coal contracts before the official ruling of the ICC.17
The renegotiated terms promised lower rates but ComEd also had to take a bullet.
The reduced coal prices were still above the market price, the reduction itself was
gradual over time, and the expiration dates had to be extended to the late 2000’s
to the early 2010’s (ComEd, 1993).
Panel (c) of Figure 1.3.2 shows that, though noisy, the delivered coal prices
at the ComEd plants started to trend differentially in early 1993. It also shows
that the prices at the ComEd plants were much higher than those at other plants.
Hence, when the ComEd plants are excluded from the sample of divested plants,
not only the parallel pre-trend assumption is reinstated but also the gap in the
pre-trends (shown in Figure 1.3.2) is removed. Formally, for the parallel pre-trend
assumption, I repeat the hypothesis tests in Subsection 1.3.2: H0 : δdivested plants =
δmatched non-divested plants and H0 : γdivested plants = γmatched non-divested plants, where δ
and γ represent a linear time trend and the mean fuel costs. The p-values from
the respective hypothesis tests are 0.448 and 0.292, implying that the differences
in the pre-trends and the average fuel costs of the two comparison groups are
stabilized.18 This is because differentially decreasing delivered coal prices at the
ComEd plants previously caused the linear time trend of the divested plants to be
more negative than that of the non-divested plants. Figure 1.3.2 also confirms that
17See Karwath (1991; 1993), Maclean(1992c; 1992a; 1992b), and Boyd (1993) for more detailed
story of how ComEd was pressured to re-negotiate.
18The p-values in the text are estimated using the 200 mi distance caliper distance matching. The
10 nearest neighbor matching yields the p-values of 0.502 and 0.336 for testing the differences in
the time trend and the mean fuel costs, respectively.
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ComEd’s coal prices decrease gradually over time.
1.3.5 Summary Statistics
With the ComEd plants excluded, matching yields a great balance in the observ-
able characteristics between the divested and the non-divested plants. Table 1.2
presents summary statistics of various plant characteristics in 1997, a year before
the first divestiture. For completeness, I provide the statistics of both the full sam-
ple and the matched sample. In the full sample panel without matching, many
non-divested plants in the West and the Southeast (non-divested plants without
the gray coloring) are included. Because these plants tend to use sub-bituminous
coal from Wyoming and Montana, their average prices, bituminous percent, and
sulfur content of the total coal deliveries are lower, and delivery distance is greater
than those at the divested plants. Matching allows to compare plants with similar
shipping conditions and the same coal type, eliminating the mean differences in
the observables between the two comparison groups.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of Divested and Non-divested Plants in 1997
Full sample Matched only
Not Difference of Not Difference of
Divested divested means Divested divested means
Capacity (MW) 939.11 881.06 58.05 939.11 749.13 189.98
[757.81] [752.68] (94.86) [757.81] [712.72] (145.13)
Plant Vintage 1959.83 1963.67 -3.84** 1959.83 1959.11 0.71
[12.26] [14.49] (1.60) [12.26] [14.50] (2.85)
Annual capacity factor 0.53 0.55 -0.02 0.53 0.49 0.04
[0.19] [0.20] (0.02) [0.19] [0.25] (0.06)
scrubbed 0.26 0.32 -0.06 0.26 0.24 0.02
[0.44] [0.47] (0.06) [0.44] [0.43] (0.08)
Millions MMBtu Delivered 44.68 45.24 -0.55 44.68 35.90 8.78
[43.90] [43.49] (5.49) [43.90] [38.05] (7.74)
Price ($/MMBtu) 1.37 1.23 0.14*** 1.37 1.34 0.03
[0.29] [0.35] (0.04) [0.29] [0.31] (0.07)
Percent spot market 0.26 0.27 -0.01 0.26 0.29 -0.03
[0.31] [0.32] (0.04) [0.31] [0.37] (0.07)
Years remaining on contracts 4.15 5.11 -0.96 4.15 5.41 -1.26
[6.27] [6.04] (0.89) [6.27] [6.25] (1.35)
Percent in-state 0.46 0.34 0.12** 0.46 0.38 0.08
[0.46] [0.45] (0.06) [0.46] [0.45] (0.09)
Percent bituminous 0.83 0.65 0.18*** 0.83 0.82 0.01
[0.36] [0.45] (0.05) [0.36] [0.37] (0.07)
Sulfur content (lbs/MMBtu) 1.40 1.17 0.23** 1.40 1.45 -0.05
[0.78] [0.90] (0.10) [0.78] [0.89] (0.16)
Ash content (lbs/MMBtu) 9.89 9.14 0.75 9.89 9.81 0.08
[5.31] [4.51] (0.64) [5.31] [6.77] (1.13)
Distance to mine (mi.) 269.33 350.34 -81.01** 269.33 268.34 0.99
[290.05] [315.25] (37.13) [290.05] [305.39] (52.23)
Plants 81 291 372 81 78 159
Notes: The 10 nearest neighbor matching is used. Coal rank is based on the years from 1990 to 1997.
Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the number
of matches to j. Brackets indicate standard devisions. Parentheses indicate standard errors which
are clustered at the plant level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level.
1.4 Replication and Revised Diff-in-Diff Estimation
1.4.1 Replication
Given the access to the EIA’s restricted fuel delivery data, I independently replicate
and confirm the results in Cicala (2015). Table 1.3 reports the replication results.
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Same results can be found in Table 2 and Table 3 of Cicala’s paper.19 The first spec-
ification reports the unmatched, unweighted OLS DiD estimation results with the
plant and the division-year fixed effects. Columns (2)-(7) report the matched DiD
results where matching criteria changes in the order of distance threshold (200,
100 and 50 mi.) and nearest neighbors (10, 5, and 1). For the coal type matching
criterion, predominant coal burned in 1997 is used.20 Throughout the paper, I re-
peatedly report the OLS specification, and the matched DiD with the 10 nearest
neighbor criterion as the default specifications.21
Table 1.3: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): Replication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1(Divest) -0.131*** -0.125*** -0.189*** -0.148* -0.125*** -0.130*** -0.136**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.058) (0.077) (0.044) (0.046) (0.063)
Coal Type Year 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 5 1
Proximity Threshold (mi.) 200 100 50
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.802 0.715 0.706 0.662 0.717 0.720 0.733
Total Plants 397 230 146 69 205 176 130
Divested Plants 88 87 74 39 87 87 87
Control Plants 309 143 72 30 118 89 43
Observations 86049 46848 28286 12594 37275 32749 23132
Notes: Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the
number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level.
19Due to minor changes in the data cleaning process (treatment of duplicate observations, classi-
fication of electric plants vs. industrial plants, etc.), the replicated estimates differ slightly from the
original estimates in Cicala. However, the magnitude of difference is minimal; the point estimates
start to differ at most by 0.003.
20Cicala’s sample includes 5 additional non-divested plants that are excluded in this paper. These
plants have always operated as independent power producers and have never been subject to rate
regulation. Historically, independent power producers were allowed to enter and provide electric-
ity to regulated utilities since the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978. But, the
number was limited before electricity market deregulation.
21The 10 nearest neighbor criterion is also a preferred specification in Cicala.
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1.4.2 Revised DiD Estimation
Table 1.4 shows that once the ComEd plants are excluded from the estimation, the
DiD coefficient falls to a range of 3% to 6% instead of 12% and they become sta-
tistically insignificant. First, Columns (1) and (4) of Table 1.4 repeat the estimation
results reported in Columns (1) and (5) of Table 1.3. Then, Columns (2) and (5)
present estimation results after excluding the ComEd plants but keeping 1997 as
the reference year for a plant’s coal type. In Columns (3) and (6), I further refine the
coal type definition to be all the pre-treatment years between 1990 and 1997. When
the seven ComEd plants are excluded, the regression coefficients reveal that the ef-
fect of divestiture is between about 3% and 6%. The effect is marginally significant
only with the 10 nearest neighbor matching without correcting for the coal type
definition (Column 4). For the rest of the paper, the sample excludes the ComEd
plants.
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Table 1.4: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): Adjusting for the ComEd Plants
(1) Full (2) Adj.1 (3) Adj.2 (4) Full (5) Adj.1 (6) Adj.2
1(Divest) -0.131*** -0.037 -0.036 -0.125*** -0.067* -0.060
(0.041) (0.027) (0.028) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038)
Coal Type Year 97 97 90-97 97 97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10 10
Proximity Threshold (mi.)
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.802 0.818 0.820 0.717 0.773 0.777
Total Plants 397 390 385 205 181 159
Divested Plants 88 81 81 87 80 81
Control Plants 309 309 304 118 101 78
Observations 86049 84642 84404 37275 33094 32431
Notes: “Full” indicates the full sample of divested plants including the ComEd plants. “Adj.1”
indicates the adjusted sample excluding the ComEd plants without correcting for the coal type
definition. “Adj.2” indicates the adjusted sample that excludes the ComEd plants and uses the coal
type definition based on the years between 1990 and 1997. Matched non-divested plants receive
weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the number of matches to j. Standard errors are
clustered at the plant level.
Although the revised effect of deregulation is statistically insignificant, it is
possible to examine the full distribution of treatment effect and assess the com-
prehensive performance. This can be implemented by estimating a separate DiD
regression (Equation 1.3.1) for each individual divested plant and its respective
matches instead of pooling all the plants. Figure 1.4.1 illustrates that there is con-
siderable heterogeneity in the treatment effect. While the mean is at about -0.06,
the 25th and 75th percentiles are -0.24 and 0.07, respectively. Heterogeneity in the
treatment effect is revisited in Section 1.6.
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Figure 1.4.1: Distribution of Treatment Effect
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Notes: The 10 nearest neighbor matching is used to estimate a DiD coefficient for individual di-
vested plants. Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m
is the number of matches to j.
1.5 Confounding Factor: the Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments
When Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (known as the Acid Rain
Program) introduced a cap-and-trade market for SO2, power plants had three op-
tions of compliance: buy emissions allowances, install abatement equipment called
scrubbers, and/or switch to low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal. In theory, plants with
high abatement costs could buy emission allowances. Yet, rate regulation incen-
tivized plants to adopt scrubbers over other compliance methods. Averch and
Johnson (1962) predicted that regulated plants prefer capital-intensive abatement
equipment as their profit rates depend on capital expenditure. In a paper that stud-
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ies coal-fired power plants’ compliance decisions for a regulation on another chem-
ical, nitrogen oxides, Fowlie (2010) confirms the Averch-Johnson effect empirically
and further finds that divested plants are more likely to buy emission allowances
than abatement equipment. She reasons that flexible methods such as allowance
purchases provide divested plants an option value of later adjusting to the cheap-
est method while installing scrubbers would be an irreversible commitment. In
the case of the SO2 regulation, the same logic carries over to switching to cleaner
sub-bituminous coal as divested plants have a somewhat flexible control over their
future coal usage. Cicala (2015) verifies that rate-regulated (non-divested) plants
disproportionately adopt scrubbers while more divested plants choose to switch
to low-sulfur sub-bituminous coal.
Unfortunately, a diverging response by the divested plants to the environmen-
tal regulation confounds the treatment effect of divestiture. When cleaner sub-
bituminous coal is also cheaper, it is difficult to identify why divested plants switch:
whether it is for cost savings in a deregulated market or for the environmental
compliance. On one hand, if divested plants can switch for cost savings, coal-
switching would be a mechanism through which deregulation brings the cost re-
ductions. On the other hand, disproportionate coal-switching can be the divested
plants’ compliance to the environmental regulation. Moreover, for most of the di-
vested plants, the fuel cost data is missing between 1999 and 2002 when the ARP
is implemented in 2000.22 This implies that the econometrician cannot zoom into
a time period in which divestitures have taken place but the environmental regu-
lation has not. When the actual motives behind coal-switching are unidentified, a
22The market began in 1996 for dirtier plants. From 2000 onward, they received reduced annual
allowances. Other remaining coal-fired plants also had to comply in 2000 when the second phase
started. As a result, almost all of the coal power plants in the U.S. had to take action to comply with
the SO2 emissions policy in 2000.
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failure to include coal-switching as a control variable leads to an omitted variable
bias. Once coal-switching is accounted for, the treatment effect represents cost re-
ductions from burning the same coal type. I interpret this as the lower bound of
the treatment effect.
Although it is impossible to tease apart the exact contribution of the ARP and
that of divestiture on coal-switching, one could take a glimpse of how divested
and non-divested plants would have behaved absent the environmental regula-
tion. By separately looking at plants with and without scrubbers prior to the
ARP, I compare how different degrees of environmental compliance affect coal-
switching behavior between the divested and the non-divested plants. The idea is
that when scrubbers typically cleanse more than 90% of SO2 emissions (EPA, 2002),
one can attribute any additional coal-switching from the divested plants (relative
to the non-divested plants) to switching for cost saving purposes instead of en-
vironmental compliance. However, I find that divested plants with scrubbers do
not switch more than non-divested plants with scrubbers. That is, when divested
plants do not need to further reduce SO2emissions, they do not carry out addi-
tional coal-switching. This suggests that divestiture alone would have led to less
fuel-switching. Yet, this does not grant that the environmental regulation alone
explains all the fuel-switching. More plants would have remained rate-regulated
and adopted scrubbers absent the market deregulation. Then, the best one can in-
terpret coal-switching post 2000 is that it was a comprehensive response to both
the market deregulation and the environmental regulation.
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1.5.1 Differential Trends in Switching to Sub-bituminous Coal
First, I document that the divested plants disproportionately switch away from
bituminous to sub-bituminous coal upon divestiture.23 To evaluate the differential
trend, I interact the treatment dummy for divested plants with dummies indicating
the year relative to the divestiture year. Formally, I estimate:
1(sub-bit coal)it =
8
∑
t′=−8,t′ 6=0
βt′1(divest)i1(t = t′ years since divestiture)t
+ γi + δt + εit
where 1(divest)i indicates a dummy equal to 1 if the plant i is ever divested, and
1(t = t′ years since divestiture)t indicates a dummy equal to 1 if time t is t′ years
since divestiture. The omitted year is the year prior to divestiture. Note that the
Acid Rain Program is implemented in 2000 and no divested plant reports the post-
treatment cost data before 2000 due to the EIA’s data collection rule. This means
that the effect of divestiture on fuel-switching is identified only with the presence
of the environmental regulation.
Figure 1.5.1 plots the estimated coefficients from the above estimating equa-
tion. In the regression, I drop the plants that use sub-bituminous coal in the pre-
treatment period because they do not switch their coal type. The figure highlights
a stark difference in the switching rate between the divested and the non-divested
plants. Gradual instead of instantaneous switching by the divested plants suggests
that certain plants have residual long-term contracts. Yet, the short-term effect
should be interpreted with a caveat that it (i.e., less than 3 years since divestiture)
is identified by a handful of plants that fully report the fuel cost data. By the end
23See Cicala (2015) for evidence that rate-regulated plants disproportionately choose to install
scrubbers.
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of the data in 2009, the number of divested “sub-bituminous” plants has increased
about 3.1 times from 1997 while the same number for the non-divested plants has
increased about 1.9 times from 1997.
Figure 1.5.1: Fraction of Plants Burning Sub-Bituminous Coal
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Instead of looking at the time trend, one can also estiamte the average effect
of divestiture and the Acid Rain Program on fuel-switching. Table DiD Estimates
of 1(Sub-bit) reports the cofficient from regressing 1(sub-bit coal)it on the post-
treatment dummy. Divestiture together with the ARP implementation cause the
probability of coal-switching to increase by about 13 percentage point (Column
3). The baseline probability or the fraction of sub-bituminous plants in the pre-
treatment period for divested plants is about 9%.
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Table 1.5: DiD Estimates of 1(Sub-bit)
(1) (2) (3)
1(Divest) 0.200*** 0.130*** 0.127***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.044)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Div-Year FE Yes
R2 0.822 0.711 0.711
Total Plants 385 210 159
Divested Plants 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 129 78
Observations 84404 43479 32431
Notes: Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the
number of matches to j. Standard errors clustered at the plant level.
1.5.2 Effect of coal-switching on Delivered Fuel Costs
Differential rates of coal-switching between the divested and the non-divested
plants raise a concern that the environmental compliance motives can be the source
of fuel cost reductions among divested plants.24 Although it is hard to identify
what influneces coal-switching, one can still estimate how much of cost reductions
is attributed to coal-switching. By controlling for coal-switching, I decompose
the overall cost reductions into the “pure” divestiture component and the coal-
switching component. If coal-switching is a mechanism through which divested
24To be fair, Cicala also addresses this concern. In order to show that coal-switching does not
account for a large portion of cost reductions, he allows the treatment effect to differ between plants
that switch coal types post divestiture and the ones that always burn the same coal. He finds that
“while switching yields a larger drop (in fuel costs), it accounts for a relatively small fraction of
the overall treatment effect” and concludes that divestiture is effective regardless of the switching
behavior.
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plants save input costs, then the overall effect of divestiture will be given by a sum
of the coefficients on the coal-switching dummy and the treatment dummy. In
constrast, if the environmental regulation is the only driver behind coal-switching,
the divestiture effect will be given solely by the treatment dummy. Therefore, I
interpret the coefficient on the treatment dummy as a lower bound for the effect of
divestiture on cost reductions. Formally, I estimate the following equation:
log(pit) = γi + δt + α1(sub-bituminous)it + β1(divest)it + εit
where 1(sub-bituminous)it denotes a dummy equal to 1 if the plant i’s predomi-
nant source of coal is sub-bituminous in time t. Note that the dummy of a plant
that always burns one type of coal is absorbed by the plant fixed effects. Then,α is
identified by plants that switch their coal type.
Table 1.6 reports the estimation results. They show that if divested plants are
compared to the non-divested plants with the same coal type, divestiture has a
less-than-3% effect on cost reductions. In other words, a half of the earlier 6% effect
is driven by the compositional changes of the divested plants: more of them switch
to cleaner and cheaper sub-bituminous coal. The large, significant coefficient on
the sub-bituminous dummy confirms that coal-switching is indeed the main driver
behind the cost reductions.
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Table 1.6: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): Accounting for Coal Type Switch
(1) (2) (3)
1(Divest) -0.007 -0.038 -0.033
(0.025) (0.033) (0.035)
1(Sub-bit) -0.144*** -0.198*** -0.210***
(0.019) (0.033) (0.034)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Div-Year FE Yes
R2 0.826 0.789 0.790
Total Plants 385 210 159
Divested Plants 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 129 78
Observations 84404 43479 32431
Notes: 1(sub-bit)it indicates the predominant source of coal of a plant i in time t. Matched non-
divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the number of matches to
j. Standard errors clustered at the plant level.
1.5.3 Contribution to Coal-Switching
One could approximate how divested and non-divested plants would have be-
haved absent the environmental regulation. Because of an earlier regulation, the
1970 Clean Air Act, certain coal-fired plants had already been emitting less SO2
than what was required by the Acid Rain Program in 2000. By restricting atten-
tion to these plants, I can compare differential behavior in coal-switching between
the divested and the non-divested plants without worrying about the switching
motives associated with the environmental compliance.
Plants that already emit less than the ARP standard are the ones that have en-
tered since 1971. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments mandated new generating
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units to meet the New Source Performance Standard, which “effectively required
new coal-fired plants to install flue gas desulfurization equipment or a scrubber”
(Ellerman, 2003).25 As a consequence, these plants had minimal compliance re-
quirement, if not at all, at the onset of the ARP in 2000 (Ellerman et al., 2000).
By separately looking at plants with and without scrubbers by 1990 (the year
of the ARP legislation), I compare how different degrees of compliance require-
ment in emissions affect coal-switching behavior between the divested and the
non-divested plants. The idea is that when scrubbers cleanse more than 90% of
SO2 emissions, one can attribute any additional coal-switching from the divested
plants (relative to the non-divested plants) to cost savings instead of compliance
responses. Formally, I estimate the following equation:
1(sub-bit coal)it =+ β01(divest)it1(scrub by 1990)i
+ β11(divest)it1(No scrub by 1990)i
+ γi + δgt + εit
where δgt indicates a group-specific time fixed effects and 1(scrub by 1990)i and
1(No scrub by 1990)i respectively indicate a dummy equal to 1 if a plant has in-
stalled a scrubber before 1990 and if a plant has not installed a scrubber by 1990. Ta-
ble DiD Estimates of 1(Sub-bit): By Scrubber Status presents the estimation results.
I find that divested plants with scrubbers installed pre-1990 switch just as much
as the similar non-divested plants. That is, when divested plants do not need to
lower their SO2 emissions, they do not carry out additional coal-switching. When
divested plants do need to lower their emissions (i.e., plants without scrubbers by
25The history of the Clean Air Act dates back to 1963. Since then, amendments were enacted in
1970, 1977 and 1990. The New Source Performance Standard was first introduced in 1970 and a
stricter provision was mandated in 1977. Then, the plants had to either install scrubbers or switch
to low-sulfur coal. These regulations predate the Acid Rain Progrm which was added in 1990.
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1990), they are 16 percentage point more likely to switch to sub-bituminous coal
than the comparable non-divested plants. No switching by the scrubber-installed
divested plants suggests that divestiture alone, absent the environmental regula-
tion, would have led to less fuel-switching. Yet, one should interpret the results
with a grain of salt: the treatment effect for the divested plants with scrubbers
does not differ significantly from that for the divested plants without scrubbers
(see the p-values from the Wald test on the difference between the DiD coefficients
reported in the table as H0 : β0 = β1).
Table 1.7: DiD Estimates of 1(Sub-bit): By Scrubber Status
(1) (2) (3)
1(Divest)*1(Scrubber by 1990) 0.164 0.014 0.008
(0.105) (0.097) (0.100)
1(Divest)*1(No scrubber by 1990) 0.213*** 0.161*** 0.160***
(0.052) (0.046) (0.048)
p-value(H0 : β0 = β1) 0.673 0.172 0.173
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr-Cohort FE Yes
Time-Cohort FE Yes Yes
R2 0.824 0.716 0.715
Total Plants 385 210 159
Divested Plants 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 129 78
Observations 84404 45100 33859
Notes: “SubShare” is defined to be a sub-bituminous share of the total coal delivery to the firm i in
time t. The matched sample excludes non-divested plants with the distance more than 200 miles
from the closest divested plant. For each divested plant j, non-divested plants are matched if they
use the same coal rank as j. Coal rank of a plant is based on all the pre-trement years from 1990
to 1997. Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the
number of matches to j. Confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the plant level.
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In particular, I do not assert that the environmental regulation explains all the
fuel-switching. In theory, more plants would have installed scrubbers abset the
market deregulation. The best one can interpret coal-switching post 2000 is that it
was a combined response to both the market deregulation and the environmental
regulation.
1.6 Heterogeneous effect
Whether or not one accounts for coal-switching, deregulation has a limited impact
on a plant’s procurement costs. However, this does not imply that deregulation
has failed altogether. When power plants purchase coal via bilateral long-term
contracts, an amount of concessions a plant can extract from suppliers depends on
the plant’s incentive and/or ability to negotiate.
First, I observe that plants stuck in unfavorably high cost contracts could seize
divestiture as an opportunity to bargain better terms. Though contracts are typi-
cally difficult to break, they are not impossible to re-negotiate. In fact, coal con-
tracts have become more sophisticated in enlisting numerous reopener clauses
since the 1970’s. Major changes in environmental policies and high inflation rates
deemed negotiated prices reasonable one day but unacceptable the next day. More
recent contracts typically include provisions that could trigger a re-negotiation a)
“when government regulations that were not anticipated by either part when the
contract was executed are imposed” and b) when government regulations on emis-
sions contrain the ability of the buyer to make use of the quantities of coal that have
been contracted for” Joskow (1988). Although detailed data on contract beginning
and expiration are limited, analyzing the Coal Transportation Rate Database of
the EIA reveals that contracts, on average, were signed about 8.3 years previous
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to 1997 and had about 4.6 years remaning until expiration as of 1997. It is un-
likely that either mines or plants had anticipated market deregulation at the time
of signing such long-term contracts. In theory, an unanticipated change in regu-
latory regime such as divestiture would provide plants (or mines) an opportunity
to bargain new contract terms. I find that divested plants with highly unfavorable
(high-cost) contracts relative to the neighbors do achieve substantial cost reduc-
tions via re-negotiations.
Second, literature on countervailing power predicts that bigger buyers obtain
larger discounts from suppliers. Among numerous competing stories, a simple
theory provides an exposition that per-unit production costs are lower in serving
a larger buyer if a supplier’s production function has increasing returns to scale.26
In the case of coal, Boyd (1987) notes that large drilling and mining equipment are
associated with large output volumes of coal mines, and estimates that coal pro-
duction exhibits increasing returns to scale. Willamson explains the large buyer
discount via a concept of “dedicated assests” (1983). Joskow summarizes the con-
cept as: “the larger the annual quantity of coal that is contracted for, the more
difficult it is for the seller to quickly dispose of unanticipated supplies at a com-
pensatory price” (1987a). When losing a larger buyer is costly, coal suppliers will
submit to lower rates. I proxy a plant’s size with its production capacity and show
that plants with a bigger capacity significantly lower their fuel costs upon divesti-
ture.
Before proceeding further, I point out a caveat that the analysis is performed
on the plant level instead on the operator level. ComEd’s re-negotiation in 1993
suggests that an umbrella operating company may be a representative negotiator
26See papers listed in related literature and a survey by Snyder (2005) for other competing theo-
ries.
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for all the fuel delivered to its plants. Technically, one can repeat the analysis on
the operator level. However, a couple of reasons grant the plant level analysis
more appropriate. First, divestiture by definition entails a change in operator, at
least legally. Then, an old operator makes an “exit” and a new operator makes
an “entry” from the econometrician’s point of view. Econometric analysis would
drop observations from the “exiting” or “entering” operators because either pre-
or post-treatment data is “missing.”27 Second, an average and a median number
of plants per operator is respectively 2.02 and 1 suggesting that any given operator
is likely to be responsible for managing, at most, a few plants. Lastly, contracts
reported in Coal Transportation Rate Database deliver to 1.7 plants on average
(median 1 plant). Because plant operators make contract decisions based on a few
plants, the plant level analysis would not deviate too much from the operator level
analysis. Nonetheless, I state my assumption that I take contracts as plant-specific
in interpreting the estimation results.
1.6.1 Disadvantaged Coal Contracts
This section shows that divested plants with unfavorable contracts reduce their
costs while the ones with no disadvantage maintain the status quo. First, I con-
struct a measure of contract disadvantage. This variable is then interacted with the
DiD term to estimate a heterogeneous treatment effect of how different degrees
of contract disadvantage affect cost reductions. I define the disadvantage term as
the percentage difference between the own contract price and the average contract
27This problem can be potentially remedied by figuring out an operator’s ultimate parent com-
pany. Power plant database from Platts keeps a record of a plant’s ultimate parent company. Yet,
in many cases, multiple plants previously owned by a single utility are not necessarily sold off to
a single operator. Then, the problem of assigning a proper operator is further complicated. Two
plants sold off to different operators would have a single previous operator.
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price at the neighboring plants. Formally, for a divested plant k,
Contract disadvantage ≡
pck0 − p̄cj0
p̄cj0
, where
pck0 =
Dec.1997
∑
t=Jan.1990
(MMBtu delivered under contract ∗Cost of contract in dollars)kt
(Total MMBtu delivered under contract)k
p̄cj0 = ∑
j∈K
1
NK
Dec.1997
∑
t=Jan.1990
(MMBtu delivered under contract ∗Cost of contract in dollars)jt
(Total MMBtu delivered under contract)j
and K indicates a set of neighboring plants j near plant k.
The neighboring plants of plant k include either divested or non-divested plants
that use the same rank coal as k. Like in the matching procedure, there is arbitrari-
ness in the choice of which plants constitute the neighbors. However, the estima-
tion results are robust to different choices of neighbors. Lastly, it is important to
note that the contract price of coal is different from the overall price of coal, the
outcome variable in Equation 1.3.1. The overall price of coal delivered to a firm
is the quantity-weighted (i.e., MMBtu-weighted) average of both the contract and
the spot market prices. The disadvantage term is based only on the contract prices.
With the interaction term, the new DiD estimating equation becomes:28
log(pit) = γi + δt + β01(divest)it + β11(divest)it(Disadv.)i + εit,
where Disadv. indicates a contract disadvantage measure, defined in Equation
1.3.1. However, the above equation produces biased estimates. Because the pre-
treatment contract prices appear both on the left-hand and on the right-hand side,
the plant fixed effects introduce a simultaneity bias (Nickell, 1981). The size of
28To allow for different time trends between the disadvantaged and the non-disadvantaged
plants, one can interact the time fixed effects with the contract disadvantage term. Such specifi-
cation produces similar results.
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the bias will be proportional to the inverse of the time dimension, T, of the data.
Because the data is in monthly units for multiple years, the bias should be small.
Regardless, an instrumental variable approach is adopted to restore the unbiased
estimates.
Table 1.8 reports the heterogeneous treatment effect by a plant’s pre-period dis-
advantage. Columns (1)-(2) report OLS DiD estimates. In constructing a spread
between the own contract price and the neighbor contract prices, the 10 nearest
neighbors are considered. Columns (3)-(6) report the results with matched DiD
estimations. In Columns (1), (3) and (5), significant negative coefficients on the in-
teracted DiD term imply that the divested plants that pay a premium above their
neighbors reduce costs upon divestiture. Yet, a closer look at the data reveals that
most of cost reductions by the divested plants come from the plants with the most
disadvantaged contracts in the top 25% (Columns (2), (4) and (6)). Those plants
reduce costs by about 18% (β0 + β1 from Column(6)). It is intuitive that that plants
without substantial saving prospects would not leverage deregulation. When they
would not earn substantially better rates than the prevaling market price, the ben-
efits of re-negotiation do not necessarilly outweigh the costs.
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Table 1.8: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): By Contract Disadvantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Divest) 0.018 0.061** -0.018 0.019 -0.016 0.026
(0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
1(Divest)*Disadv. -0.442*** -0.489*** -0.499***
(0.144) (0.113) (0.117)
1(Divest)*1(Disadv.: 4th Q.) -0.190*** -0.206*** -0.208***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.045)
1(Sub-bit) -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.169*** -0.174*** -0.180*** -0.191***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes Yes
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.831 0.831 0.797 0.798 0.800 0.801
Total Plants 368 368 207 207 157 157
Divested Plants 81 81 81 81 81 81
Control Plants 287 287 126 126 76 76
Observations 81267 81267 44634 44634 33594 33594
Notes: “Disadv.” of a plant i is defined to be a percentage difference between the average coal prices
of i and those of the neighbors. “1(Disadv. : 4th Q.)” is a dummy equal to 1 if a disadvantage
measure of plant i falls into the 4th quantile. Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for
each divested facility j where m is the number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at the
plant level.
Though the magnitude of bias decreases as the sample size, especially the time
dimension, increases, one may still worry that the bias could overturn the esti-
mation results as the direction of bias is unclear.29 However, proper instrumental
variables can successfully address the endogeneity issue. Ideal instruments need
to explain the degree of contract unfavorableness (i.e., spread between the own
and the neighbors’ contract prices) while uncorrelated with the unobserved errors.
I use environmental quality of coal as the instruments. For a divested plant k, the
first IV is the percentage difference between the average of k’s own ash contents of
29In a dynamic panel model, the estimated coefficient is inflated (deflated) if the true coefficient
is positive (negative) (Nickell, 1981).
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coal delivered under contract and that of k’s neighboring plants. The second IV is
an indicator variable of whether or not a plant belongs to the Phase I of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. Formally, the IV’s are:
xi0− ¯xj0
¯xj0
and 1(CAA Phase I)
where x indicates the ash content of coal delivered under contract, the bar indi-
cates the average across the neighboring plants and 1(CAA Phase I) indicates a
dummy equal to 1 if a plant is subjective to the Phase 1 of the Clean Air Act. In
general, ash content of coal is negatively correlated with the coal prices because
higher ash content increases maintenance costs. Then, it is plausible that unfa-
vorable contracts offer not only more expensive rates but also worse quality coal.
Percentage difference in ash content is a proxy measure of contract unfavorability.
For the exogeneity condition, the nature of coal contracts deems it likely that
unobserved fluctuations (errors) in the coal prices are uncorrelated with the envi-
ronmental measures of coal. Terms of a contract such as coal prices and specifica-
tions of environmental contents are typically locked in upon signing the contract
(Joskow, 1985, 1987a). When the relation between the coal prices and the environ-
mental measures is formulaic, the changes in the environmental measures should
all be reflected in the observed prices but not in the unobserved components of the
prices. In other words, sulfur and ash contents of coal affect the contract prices in
a pre-determined manner as specified under the terms of contract but not in any
other unobserved way.
However, there still is an exogeneity concern that shipping rates, an unob-
served portion of the delivered prices, are set based on environmental quality of
coal being delivered. Busse and Keohane (2007) finds that rail companies are able
to discriminate power plants based on whether or not the plant is subjective to SO2
emissions compliance. If ash content of coal is perfectly correlated with the sulfur
content, then the ash content would be correlated with the unobserved shipping
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costs. However, there is no obvious geological relation between the sulfur and the
ash contents of coal.30 Moreover, the rail companies, in practice, identified dirtier
plants based on whether or not a plant was subjective to the earlier phase of the
Clean Air Act. It is unclear whether the rail companies had the authority to mea-
sure and discriminate specifically on the actual sulfur contents of coal. To address
for the potential differences in unobserved shipping costs, I explicitly control for
whether or not a plant is subjective to the earlier phase of the Clean Air Act.
Table 1.9 reports the IV DiD estimation results. Columns (1) repeats the DID es-
timation results without using any IV’s. Column (3) presents a specification with
the afore-mentioned ash and Clean Air Act IV’s and Column (2) is the first stage re-
gression. The first stage regression suggests that the dirtier Phase I plants actually
pay lower prices than the Phase II plants though the difference is not statistically
significant. Yet, including the Clean Air Act dummy creates a potential weak IV
problem. A specification only with the ash IV is reported in Columns (4) and (5).
Once the Clean Air Act IV is removed, the first stage F-stat is about 14. The esti-
mated coefficients are more negative than the specification without the IV.
30Ash typically consists of inorganic matter from the earth’s crust (USGS, 2009). In contrast,
“much of the sulfur derives from the sulfur content of the plant material making up the original
peat” (Calkins, 1994).
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Table 1.9: IV DiD Estimates of Log(Price): By Contract Disadvantage
(1) No IV (2) 1st (3) IV (4) 1st (5) IV
Ash Disadv. 0.271*** 0.291***
(0.084) (0.078)
1(Phase 1 ARP) -0.131
(0.151)
1(Divest) 0.026 0.080** 0.090**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041)
1(Divest)*1(Disadv.: 4th Q.) -0.208*** -0.291*** -0.331***
(0.045) (0.076) (0.073)
1(Sub-bit) -0.191*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.018)
First stage F-stat 11.975 14.072
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10 10
First Difference Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.801 0.021 0.020
Total Plants 157 157 157
Divested Plants 81 81 81
Control Plants 76 76 76
Observations 33594 32650 32650
Notes: “Disadv.” of a plant i is defined to be a percentage difference between the average coal prices
of i and those of the neighbors. “1(Disadv. : 4th Q.)” is a dummy equal to 1 if a disadvantage
measure of plant i falls into the 4th quantile. Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for
each divested facility j where m is the number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at the
plant level.
1.6.1.1 Evidence of Contract Re-negotiation
This section provides some evidence that cost reductions arise from contract re-
negotiations as well as finding new contracts. Because the EIA database does
not collect information on supplier names prior to 2002, it is impossible to di-
rectly check whether plants change their coal suppliers before and after divesti-
41
ture. However, origin county of coal deliveries are observed, and any departure
from the original delivery source can proxy for whether contracts are terminated
or re-negotiated upon divestiture. Figure 1.6.1 plots a fraction of plants with the
same coal origin as before divestiture. It reveals that about 50% of the divested
plants with the high disadvantage retained their deliveries from the same county
as before the divestiture. However, because a number of coal suppliers exist in a
single county, this analysis ignores changes in suppliers within the same county
and is confined to changes in suppliers across counties.
Figure 1.6.1: Trends in a Proxy for Plant Re-negotiation
Notes: “High premium” indicates plants with the disadvantage term above the 75th percentile.
“Low premium” indicates plants with the disadvantage term below the 75th percentile. Matched
non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the number of matches
to j. Confidence intervals are based on clustered standard errors at the plant level.
Conditional on the same delivery source, divested plants were indeed able to
reduce costs. In order to separate the cost reductions due to re-negotiation from
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those due to switching in coal counties, I estimate the following equation:
log(pit) = + β01(divest)it1(Same County)it
+ β11(divest)it1(Same County)it(Disadv.)i
+ β21(divest)it1(Di f f . County)it,
+ β31(divest)it1(Di f f . County)it(Disadv.)i
+ γi + δgt + εit
where 1(Same County)it indicates a dummy equal to 1 if a plant continues to have
coal deliveries from the same county as before the treatment and 1(Di f f . County)it
indicates a dummy equal to 1 if a plant switches its coal delivery county after the
treatment. Large negative coefficients on the disadvantage term interacted with
the same county indicator suggest that cost reductions are made by the divested
plants without switching the delivery counties.
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Table 1.10: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): By Contract Disadvantage and Re-
negotiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Divest)*1(Same) 0.005 0.088** -0.065 0.023 -0.061 0.026
(0.043) (0.034) (0.054) (0.046) (0.056) (0.048)
1(Divest)*1(Diff.) -0.011 0.019 -0.033 -0.005 -0.028 -0.003
(0.027) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035)
1(Divest)*1(Disadv.: 4th Q.)*1(Same) -0.322*** -0.365*** -0.359***
(0.094) (0.099) (0.100)
1(Divest)*1(Disadv.: 4th Q.)*1(Diff.) -0.371** -0.435*** -0.441***
(0.174) (0.103) (0.108)
1(Sub-bit) -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.197*** -0.171*** -0.206*** -0.183***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes Yes
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.826 0.832 0.792 0.799 0.795 0.802
Total Plants 385 368 210 207 159 157
Divested Plants 81 81 81 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 287 129 126 78 76
Observations 84404 81267 45100 44634 33859 33594
Notes: “1(Disadv. : 4th Q.)” is a dummy equal to 1 if the disadvantage measure of plant i falls into
the 4th quantile. “1(Same)” is a dummy equal to 1 if a plant i continues have its delivery from the
same county as before the treatment. “1(Di f f .)” is a dummy equal to 1 if a plant i discontinues its
delivery from the pre-treatment delivery county. Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj
for each divested facility j where m is the number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at
the plant level.
1.6.2 Plant Size and Bargaining Leverage
In order to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effect of a plant’s size, I interact
the DiD term with a plant’s production capacity. Though a plant’s capacity can
be time-varying, divestiture itself does not lead to capacity upgrades or down-
grades. In other words, divestiture does not affect fuel procurement costs indi-
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rectly through changes in capacity. Formally, I estimate the following equation:
log(pit) = α0Capacityit + β01(divest)it + β11(divest)itCapacityit + γi + δt + εit,
where Capacityit indicates a plant’s nameplate capacity in 100 megawatts. Table
1.11 presents the estimation results. Columns (1)-(2) report OLS DiD estimates.
Columns (3)-(6) report the estimation results from a matched DiD with the 200 mi.
distance caliper and the 10 nearest neighbors. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include a
linear capacity term whereas Columns (2), (4) and (6) include a dummy equal to 1
if a plant’s capacity is greater than the median. The treatment effect for divested
plants with capacity one standard deviation (730 megawatts) above the average is
about 12 (α07.3 + β0 + β17.3 from column(5)) percentage point more than that for
the divested plants with the average capacity.
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Table 1.11: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): By Plant Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Divest) 0.087** 0.059* 0.076** 0.028 0.080** 0.032
(0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.039)
Nameplate -0.004 -0.012 -0.016*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
1(Divest)*Nameplate -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1(Nameplate > Median) 0.014 -0.070* -0.094**
(0.031) (0.038) (0.037)
1(Divest)*1(Nameplate > Median) -0.110*** -0.125*** -0.124***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
1(Sub-bit) -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.211*** -0.206*** -0.223*** -0.219***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10
Distance Threshold (mi.) 200 200
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes Yes
Yr-Mnth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.828 0.827 0.797 0.793 0.798 0.795
Total Plants 385 385 210 210 159 159
Divested Plants 81 81 81 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 304 129 129 78 78
Observations 84404 84404 43479 43479 32431 32431
Notes: Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the
number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level.
However, one might be concerned: a small (big) plant in fact belongs to a larger
(smaller) operator and it may gain windfall (incur smaller) concessions in fuel
prices thanks to the umbrella operator’s negotiating efforts. If such bias exists,
it would deflate the reported coefficient on the plant’s capacity. To address this is-
sue, I account for a size of an operator that the plant belongs to. Table 1.12 reports
regression estimates after controlling for various measures of an operator’s size.
Column (1) and (4) present the baseline estimates identical to Columns (1) and (5)
in Table 1.11. In Column (2) and (5), I expand the estimating equation to include the
total number of plants that the umbrella operator owns. The coefficient estimate
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on the operator’s total number of plants is -0.005, implying that increasing by 1 the
number of plants operated by the same operator induces cost reductions by about
0.5 percentage points. When the maximum number of plants an operator owns is
11, a change from the minimum to the maximum for this variable would lower fuel
costs by about 5.5 percentage points. Given that a standard deviation increase in a
plant’s capacity yields a 12 percentage point increase in the treatment effect, addi-
tional cost reductions from having another plant owned by the same operator are
modest. Columns (3) and (6) report specification with an alternative measure of
an operator’s size, total capacity owned by the operator in 100 megawatts. Again,
the coefficients on the total capacity measure are small. Statistically insignificant
and economically small coefficients on the operator’s size suggest that a plant’s
bargaining leverage follows mostly from its own size rather than the operator’s
size.
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Table 1.12: DiD Estimates of Log(Price): By Plant and Owner Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Divest) 0.087** 0.089*** 0.087** 0.080** 0.082** 0.081**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Nameplate -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.016* -0.020** -0.019**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
1(Divest)*Nameplate -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of plants owned -0.005 -0.010
(0.006) (0.007)
Total capacity owned -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
1(Sub-bit) -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.223*** -0.219*** -0.217***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Coal Type Year 90-97 90-97 90-97
m Nearest Neighbors 10 10 10
Distance Threshold (mi.)
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Div-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Yr-Mnth FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.798 0.799 0.799
Total Plants 385 385 385 159 159 159
Divested Plants 81 81 81 81 81 81
Control Plants 304 304 304 78 78 78
Observations 84404 84375 84375 32431 32402 32402
Notes: Matched non-divested plants receive weight 1mj for each divested facility j where m is the
number of matches to j. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper revisits the impact of deregulation on coal procurement costs of the U.S.
power plants. Though critical in providing the first evidence on how deregulation
impacted the largest portion of operating expenses, the earlier finding by Cicala
(2015) contains a set of plants that exhibit differential pre-trends. I also show that
the environmental regulation has induced divested plants to disproportionately
switch to cleaner and yet cheaper sub-bituminous coal. When the environmen-
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tal regulation coincides with plant divestiture, it is rather difficult to identify how
much of coal-switching and associated cost reductions are due to the environmen-
tal compliance versus the market deregulation. I estimate that divestiture leads to
about 3%˜6% cost reductions, yet at statistically insignificant levels.
However, certain plants do achieve substantial cost savings upon divestiture.
First, expensive contracts encourage plants to leverage divestiture to bargain for
lower rates. Second, a potential for bigger purchases allows plants to negotiate
cheaper rates. Future researchers and policy makers should note that deregulation
is most successful when plants have incentives and abilities to negotiate their fuel
contracts.
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Chapter 2
Mergers and Supplier Networks in
the U.S. Power Sector31
2.1 Introduction
In many business-to-business interactions where bilateral negotiations are at the
heart of economic transactions, mergers have been regarded as a tool to strengthen
bargaining leverage. This belief has its roots in the concept of countervailing power
(Galbraith, 1952) that larger buyers can negotiate lower prices. Formally, Stole and
Zwiebel (1996) and Chipty and Snyder (1999) provide a theoretical foundation for
the idea. They show that in a simple bargaining between a monopoly supplier and
non-competing buyers, a disagreement with a merged, hence larger, buyer lowers
the supplier’s bargaining surplus more than one with a smaller buyer, resulting
in lower prices for the larger buyer.32 Although generalization of the concept is
31Joint with Jose Miguel Abito, Jean-François Houde, Nathan Miller, and Matthew Weinberg
32The intuition for their result arises from the inverse Jensen’s inequality. If a supplier’s ag-
gregate surplus from bargaining is concave in quantity (e.g., convex cost function), then taking
away a larger quantity from the supplier results in a lower per-unit surplus than taking away
a smaller quantity. The relationship between buyer size and discounts is also empirically docu-
mented. Sorensen (2003) finds that larger health insurers obtain better prices from hospitals. Ho
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subtle if buyers compete with each other (Iozzi and Valletti, 2014), an empirical
bargaining literature including Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) and Ho
and Lee (2017) has adopted the framework of countervailing power as a workhorse
behind a merged firm’s bargaining leverage in bilateral oligopoly settings.33
Countervailing power, however, is not the only mechanism through which a
firm may gain its bargaining leverage. A growing literature on bargaining with
endogenous network formations focuses on an extensive margin: a threat to ex-
clude suppliers. For example, Ho and Lee (2016) allows firms to use a threat of
replacing an existing supplier with an alternative and Liebman (2016) allows firms
to commit to the maximum number of suppliers and exclude the rest. In either
case, a threat of excluding suppliers gains bargaining leverage for the buyers. Yet,
a failure to account for endogenous network formation does not grant that the
empirical results are biased in the classic (so-called Nash-in-Nash) bargaining lit-
erature.34 This is because in certain industries, firms have no room to adjust their
relationships with the suppliers. For example, a government regulator constrains
the network of insurers and hospitals to be nearly complete in California in 2004
(Ho and Lee, 2016).35 Nonetheless, the general validity of a bargaining model
(2009) finds the opposite holds as well that hospitals in a larger hospital system extract higher
reimbursement rates from health care providers. Ellison and Snyder (2010) finds that larger drug-
stores obtain better prices for off-patent and generic antibiotics from the pharmaceutical compa-
nies. Lakdawalla and Yin (2015) finds that larger health insurers negotiate lower drug prices for
their enrollees from the pharmacies. Outside of the health care industry, Chipty (1995) finds that
larger cable providers bargain for lower input prices and Normann, Ruffle and Snyder (2007) finds
evidence for volume discounts in a lab experiment.
33For example, Ho and Lee (2017) shows that if consumer substitution is sufficiently limited
across downstream firms (i.e., insurers) and dependence of rival firms of a merged downstream
firm on the merged firm’s supplier is also sufficiently limited, the logic of countervailing power
holds that a disagreement with the merged downstream firm can still lower the supplier’s bargain-
ing surplus more than one with a smaller buyer.
34“Nash-in-Nash” bargaining refers to a Nash equilibrium in a Nash bargaining game (Collard-
Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee, 2016).
35Ho and Lee (2016) finds that if a government intervention sets firm networks, then the predic-
tions from a bargaining model with a threat of exclusion coincides those from a model without.
The intuition is that as a firm contracts with almost all of the suppliers, it cannot find an alternative
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without an endogenous network formation would hinge on rather rare opportuni-
ties like nearly full networks in the cable industry or government interventions in
the health care industry.
While the exogeneity assumption on firm networks is fundamentally an em-
pirical question, there is a lack of direct empirical evidence on whether and how
firms form endogenous networks.36 In this paper, we empirically document the
formation of endogenous networks. Specifically, we provide the first evidence
that downstream mergers induce the merging entities to consolidate their sup-
plier base. Our empirical setting is the U.S. electricity/coal sector where coal-fired
power plants procure a majority of their fuel input via bilateral contracts with coal
suppliers. We begin our analysis by showing that power plants rely on a small
number of suppliers despite their access to a larger pool of suppliers. We, then,
show summary statistics on merger and acquisition (M&A) activities of power
companies. In particular, we present evidence that M&A’s are associated with sup-
plier switching, a precursor of supplier consolidation. Then, we define measures of
supplier consolidation at the plant pair level because supplier consolidation nat-
urally involves comparing procurement decisions at multiple plants, two at the
least. Lastly, we estimate the impact of M&A’s on various measures of supplier
consolidation.
Before we proceed, we address a few endogeneity problems with testing whether
M&A’s lead to supplier consolidation. First is a selection bias. In general, decisions
to merge or acquire plants are choices made by firms and therefore not random.
supplier who is willing to replace an existing supplier at a satisfactory price.
36Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014) and Carvalho and Voigtländer (2014) are few exceptions
that study linkages between firms. However, they often define a linkage between an upstream and
a downstream firm based on a fraction of the upstream firm’s sales or revenue that the downstream
firm accounts for. While a large customer of a supplier is more likely to be engaged in a strategic
negotiation with the supplier, this does not grant that firms are in contractual relationships.
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Yet, such decisions are often based on an entire group of plants as a whole (i.e.,
the total number of pairs between the two groups) rather than on a particular pair
of plants between the merging firms. In particular, if a firm M&A involves com-
bining large groups of plants, then any two plants of the merging firms are less
likely to be instrumental to the firm-level decision. Empirically, we observe that
power company M&A’s involve combining about 6.4 plants from the acquiring
firm with about 4.3 plants from the acquired firm. As a result, a M&A on average
involves a total number of 27.5 (6.4*4.3) plant pairs.37 So, we argue that any partic-
ular pair of plants of merging firms is exogenous to the firm level M&A decision.
This argument is similar to Hastings (2004) and many of the retrospective merger
analysis papers in flavor. They too argue that mergers between large corporations
are unlikely to be based on performance of specific branches or facilities.38
Another endogeneity problem we face is an omitted variable bias. We observe
empirically that M&A’s tend to occur between closely located plants. Then, it is
not unreasonable to suspect that two plants that share a similar procurement envi-
ronment are not only more likely to merge but also more likely to consolidate their
suppliers. However, many aspects of procurement environment are often unob-
served including shipping costs, the number of suppliers in the choice set, and
the degree of environmental compliance. We address a potential omitted variable
bias by restricting the sample to be pairs of plants in close proximity that arguably
share similar local market conditions. The flavor of this identification strategy is
37For mergers, we assign a bigger firm to be an acquiring firm.
38Hastings (2004) argues that the acquisition of Thrifty gas stations in California by an oil sup-
plier, ARCO was a decision made as a whole rather than a station-specific decision based on local
market conditions. Different mergers have been argued as ’national’ mergers in different indus-
tries: health insurance (Dafny, Duggan and Ramanarayanan, 2012), banks (Allen, Clark and Houde,
2014), airlines (Kim and Singal, 1993), gasoline (Hastings, 2004; Taylor and Hosken, 2007; Simpson
and Taylor, 2008; Houde, 2012)), cement (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007) , home appliances (Ashen-
felter, Hosken and Weinberg, 2013) and beer (Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weinberg, 2015).
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similar to Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) who compares operating costs between
merging and non-merging hospitals but limits the non-merging hospitals to be the
hospitals that share similar characteristics with the merging ones.
Looking at closely located plant pairs whose mergers are arguably exogenous
to a) overarching firm-level M&A decisions and b) unobservable local market con-
ditions, we find that power company M&A’s facilitate supplier consolidation. When
two power plants become a part of the same network upon a firm level M&A, two
power plants become about 23% more likely to source from common suppliers and
increase their coal dependence from the common suppliers by 47%.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2.2 briefly sum-
marizes the institutional setting of the electricity/coal industry and describes our
data and presents summary statistics. Section 2.3 describes the relationship be-
tween M&A’s and procurement decisions. In Section 2.4, we conclude and suggest
a direction for future research.
Related Literature
We contribute to two strands of literature: merger and bargaining. First, while
the merger literature is vast, there is very little direct evidence on how mergers in-
duce cost reductions.39 In part, this is because of inherent difficulties in gathering
the corporate information related to costs [DOJ & FTC, 2010]. To our knowledge,
Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weinberg (2015) is the only paper that directly identi-
fies a cost reduction mechanism of a merger. They find that a merger between
two beer manufacturers leads to substantial reductions in shipping costs as the
merged firm begins to produce beer in multiple breweries across the U.S. Yet, in
39Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weinberg (2014) provides an extensive survey of papers that conduct
a retrospective merger analysis. Weinberg and Hosken (2013) provides an extensive survey of
papers that use structural models to simulate the impact of mergers on prices and costs.
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other industries, researchers often do not directly observe the mechanisms through
which a merged buyer extracts more discounts from its suppliers.40 Although this
paper does not directly estimate the impact of supplier consolidation on negoti-
ated input prices, it recognizes supplier consolidation as a potential cost reduction
mechanism of mergers.
Second, we visit the assumption of exogenous firm networks that “Nash-in-
Nash” bargaining literature tends to leverage. Proposed by Horn and Wolinsky
(1988), “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining refers to a Nash equilibrium in a Nash bar-
gaining game (Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee, 2016). In the context of a
bargaining model, the Nash equilibrium (i.e., the first “Nash”) implies that an up-
stream and a downstream firm negotiate a price conditional on all other pairs reach an
agreement. Hence, empirical “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining papers assume that firms
do not deviate from their bargaining counter-parties observed in the data. Despite
the exogeneity assumption of “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining on firm networks, the
bargaining concept has been widely used in the applied literature for its tractability
and computational advantage. For example, researchers have employed the pro-
tocol in studying negotiated prices between television content providers and cable
companies (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Crawford et al., 2015), hospitals and
health care insurers (Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town, 2015; Ho and Lee, 2017),
hospitals and medical device manufacturers (Grennan, 2013), and coffee manufac-
turers and retail supermarkets (Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas, 2010).
However, a growing empirical literature on endogenous network formations
challenges the exogeneity assumption on firm networks to be unrealistic (Ghili,
40In the health care sector, it is well established that hospital mergers lead to increases in ne-
gotiated hospital prices with insurers. Gaynor and Town (2012) provides an extensive summary
of papers with such findings. While increased bargaining leverage is argued as a reason behind
merger-induced price increases, measures of bargaining leverage are, to large extent, unobserved.
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2016; Ho and Lee, 2016; Liebman, 2016; Wang, 2017). If firms are allowed to ne-
gotiate with other firms outside of their network, their bargaining leverage tends
to increase as the value of their outside option increases. However, while the ex-
ogeneity assumption is fundamentally an empirical question, there is very little
evidence on how firms choose their suppliers, especially upon mergers.
2.2 Institution & Data
2.2.1 Institution
In theory, the electricity/coal sector exhibits a few features that make a down-
stream firm’s supplier consolidation attractive or at least less harmful. First, coal
mining often exhibits a sizable —though heterogeneity is substantial— minimum
efficient scale in production (Zimmerman, 1981). Empirically, Boyd (1987) finds
that only a handful of mines in Illinois achieved the optimal production scale in
the mid 70’s. Then, it can be beneficial for a buyer to reduce the number of suppli-
ers and in extreme, commit all of its coal purchase from one large mine (Joskow,
1985). The idea is that once the buyer commits, the mine operator can expand its
capacity to an efficient scale, reduce unit costs and potentially pass on some of the
savings as a lower price.
Yet, one might argue that larger quantity contracts create a hold-up problem
for the buyer. The problem is that a supplier can extract most of the surplus of a
buyer when the supplier knows that “the larger the annual quantity of coal that
is contracted for, the more difficult it will be for a buyer to replace supplies at a
comparable price if the seller withdraws them from the market” (Joskow, 1987a).
However, by specifying the conditions for future transactions ex ante, long-term
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contracts can protect the buyer from ex post opportunism problems (Williamson,
1983). Joskow (1987a) finds that empirically, the larger the contract quantities are,
the longer the contract duration is, suggesting that longer contracts are employed
to protect the participants from an increased hold-up problem. Moreover, the na-
ture of a hold-up problem applies to suppliers as well; “the larger the annual quan-
tity of coal that is contracted for, the more difficult it is for the seller to quickly
dispose of unanticipated supplies if the buyer breaches” (Joskow, 1987a). So, it is
unclear whether larger quantity contracts create a more of a severe hold-up prob-
lem for the supplier or the buyer. At the least, to the extent that larger quantity
contracts improve a supplier’s production economies of scale, a merger would in-
centivize the merged firm to consolidate its coal demand into a handful of large
contracts. Nonetheless, whether mergers lead to supplier consolidation remains
as an empirical question.
2.2.2 Data Sources
Data used in this paper is constructed by merging multiple databases from multi-
ple data agencies: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA), S&P Global Platts, and SDC Platinum. Data consists of two
major components: fuel transactions between power plants and suppliers, and
M&A’s and ownership structure of power plants. First, EIA’s form 423/923 pro-
vide the fuel transaction data. S&P Global Platts’ North American Coal Funda-
mental Dataset supplements the supplier information in the EIA data. Second,
EIA’s forms 860, 876 and 906, EIA’s Electric Monthly Power and EPA’s eGrid pro-
vide the base for plants’ ownership structure. SDC Platinum M&A database sup-
plements the power company M&A information.
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2.2.3 Summary Statistics on Supplier Concentration
We provide descriptive evidence that in the electricity/coal sector, supplier con-
centration is common. First, we show that power plants rely on a small number of
suppliers and commit to a very few suppliers. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics
on the number of suppliers and the concentration ratios of the largest suppliers.
We see that plants on average contract with 3.3 suppliers but commit 73% of its
coal delivery from the largest supplier.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics on Supplier Consolidation
Mean Median S.d. Obs
Number of Suppliers 3.33 2.00 2.81 8199
CR1 0.73 0.76 0.25 8197
CR2 0.90 1.00 0.15 8197
CR3 0.95 1.00 0.10 8197
Note: Unit of observation is a plant-year.
Second, we show that plants have an access to multiple suppliers but still rely
on a relatively small number of suppliers. In principle, larger plants can allocate
its coal demand to more suppliers. In Table 2.2, we report the same statistics in
Table 2.1 by four different quantiles of plant capacity. We do observe that larger
plants tend to have more suppliers. For example, plants with their capacity in
the 4th quantile (i.e., Column 4) have about 4.9 suppliers on average while plants
with their capacity in the 1st quantile (i.e., Column 1) have about 2.2 suppliers.
Nonetheless, larger plants also commit most of the delivery to a few largest sup-
pliers. Plants with the capacity in the 4th quantile (i.e., Column 4) source about
64% of its delivery to the largest supplier and 83% from the two largest suppliers.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics on Supplier Consolidation by Plant Size
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Capacity (MW) 192.22 525.33 996.94 2026.08
Number of Suppliers 2.17 2.73 3.53 4.92
CR1 0.83 0.77 0.69 0.64
CR2 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.83
CR3 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91
N 2067 2044 2051 2035
Note: Each column denotes four different quantiles of plant capacity measured in megawatts.
Graphically, Figure 2.2.1 shows a distribution of power plants and coal mines
in the U.S. Although suppliers tend to own multiple mines, the map suggests that
across the country except for the West, power plants have a large reservoir of sup-
pliers from which they can source their coal.
Figure 2.2.1: Coal-fired Power Plants and Coal Mines in the U.S.
Note: Green circles represent coal-fired power plants. Red triangles represent coal mines. An
establishment is shown if it ever operated between 1990 and 2012.
Lastly, we show that larger suppliers tend to engage in longer contracts. In the-
ory, long-term contracts can mitigate a hold-up problem induced by larger quan-
tity contracts. Then, we expect to observe longer contracts for larger suppliers.
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Figure 2.2.2 plots a fraction of suppliers that “survive” or continue to deliver to a
plant from t− 1 to t. The graph plots the survival rate for the largest suppliers and
the rest of the suppliers where a supplier is plant-specific. That is, in the survival
analysis, we regard a supplier A to a plant 1 as a separate entity from the same
supplier A to another plant 2. A plant-specific supplier is defined to be the largest
supplier if it is ever the largest supplier to that particular plant. For example, the
largest supplier to a plant A is not necessarily the largest supplier to a plant B.
The graph shows that after about 4 years of coal delivery, about 75% of the largest
suppliers continue their delivery while only about 25% of all other suppliers con-
tinue to do so. This empirical observation neither proves or disproves the theory
that longer contracts mitigate the hold-up problems. Nevertheless, because long-
term contracts are otherwise undesirable (Joskow, 1988), the positive correlation
between contract quantities and contract length seems to suggest that long-term
contracts are employed to address the potential hold-up problems.
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Figure 2.2.2: Duration of Plant-Supplier Relationship
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Note: Kaplan-Meier survival probability estimates. Unit of observation is a plant-supplier-year. A
supplier is defined to be the largest supplier if it is ever the largest supplier.
2.2.4 Summary Statistics on M&A Activities
In this subsection, we present the aggregate trends in M&A’s and show that M&A’s
are associated with more supplier switching, a precursor of supplier consolidation.
In the electricity sector, there are a total of 73 unique M&A’s between power
companies from 1990 to 2012. These 73 M&A’s involve a total of 274 (188 unique)
plants. On average, each M&A changes the ownership structure of about 5.3
plants. About 50 plants go through multiple M&A’s. Sub-figure (a) of Figure 2.2.3
shows that the number of M&A’s peaks between 1998 and 2000 but M&A’s do
occur throughout the entire period. Sub-figure (b) of Figure 2.2.3 shows that the
number of power companies decline over time as a result of the M&A’s. Yet, the
number of power plants is mostly stable over time until 2012. Excluding the year
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2012, there is, on average, 1 entry and 1.5 exits per year throughout the period.41
Figure 2.2.3: Aggregate Trends
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41About 20 exits happen in 2012 alone.
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In Table 2.3, we summarize the characteristics (i.e., capacity and distance) of
M&A’s from an individual plant’s perspective. At the plant level, an average M&A
brings about additional 4400 MW capacity to the plant’s original network. This
new addition is considerable in size given that the original network has about
5000 MW of capacity on average. Moreover, M&A’s are between closely located
companies. Again from a plant’s perspective, the shortest distance to a plant in the
merging network is about 305 km. Relatively to the minimum distance to the orig-
inal network (i.e., the shortest distance within the same network), which is about
80 km, the distance to the merging network is relatively far away. However, given
that the average distance between any two random plants in the same census divi-
sion is about 800 km, M&A’s still tend to occur between firms in proximity. Lastly,
a typical M&A involves a group of 6.4 plants merging with or acquiring a group
of 4.3 plants.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on Mergers and Acquisitions
Mean Median S.d. Obs
A. Plant level
Min. Dist. to Original Network (km) 80.47 43.62 122.18 274
Min. Dist. to Merging Network (km) 304.66 157.95 401.48 274
Original Network Capa. (GW) 5.05 5.60 3.03 274
Merging Network Capa. (GW) 4.42 3.33 4.88 274
B. M&A level
Number of Plants: Original Network 6.36 5.00 5.34 73
Number of Plants: Merging Network 4.31 3.00 3.42 73
Note: For Panel A., unit of observation is a plant-year. For Panel B, unit of observation is a firm-
level M&A.
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2.2.5 M&A and Supplier Switching
Now, we explore whether M&A’s are associated with more supplier switching. In
particular, we regress a dummy indicator for whether a plant switches its suppli-
ers on a dummy indicator for whether a plant is involved in a M&A in the last
three years. It is important to note that such regressions show correlations rather
than causality and that supplier switching is not a sufficient condition for supplier
consolidation. Nonetheless, the regressions are useful in that they shed some light
on the issue of omitted variable bias. Formally, we estimate:
1(Switch Supplier)it = α · 1(M&A Last 3 Years)it + X′itβ + γt + εit
where 1(Switch Supplier)it is defined to be 1 if the plant i switches its largest sup-
plier in time period t from t − 1, 1(M&A Last 3 Years)it is defined to be 1 if the
plant i is involved in a M&A in any time period from t− 3 to t, Xit denotes a set of
plant characteristics and γt denotes either year or division-year fixed effects where
a division is a census division. Intuitively, the division-year effects allow the M&A
dummy to capture the mean difference in the probability of supplier switching
across the M&A plants and the non-M&A plants in the same census division and
time period. This specification is useful in that it compares plants that are facing
the same division-level procurement environment, which the baseline regression
with the year effects do not control for.
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results with the outcome variable defined based
on the largest supplier. Column (1) is a baseline specification with the year effects
and without any controls. The coefficient represents that the probability of switch-
ing the largest supplier is correlated with the plants that are a part of a M&A in
the last three years by 3.6 pp more than it is with the plants that are not a part
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of a M&A in the last three years. Column (2) accounts for some plant character-
istics. The inclusion of plant characteristics removes the statistical significance,
but the magnitude of the coefficient remains mostly unchanged. However, plant
characteristics do not fully control for unobservable procurement conditions that
the plant might face. Column (3) accounts for any division-specific market condi-
tions by employing the division-year fixed effects instead of the year fixed effects.
The coefficient shows that conditional on the division level market conditions, the
probability of switching the largest supplier is correlated with the M&A plants by
5.8 pp more than the non-M&A plants. Since about 25% of the M&A plants switch
their largest suppliers, the coefficient of 5.8 pp translates into about 23% increase
in the probability of switching.
Yet, all of the regressions in Table 2.4 do not specify a plant fixed effects be-
cause the outcome variable is defined inter-temporally. Because M&A plants can
be systematically different from the non-M&A plants in terms of supplier switch-
ing, we also estimate a specification (i.e., Column 4) only with the plants that is
ever a part of a M&A. In this specification, the M&A coefficient would be identi-
fied by the within plant variation by whether or not that particular plant is a part
of a M&A in the last three years. Column (4) reports the estimation result. The es-
timated coefficient in Column (4) remains unchanged from the one in Column (3),
suggesting that the probability of supplier switching in Column (3) is not entirely
identified from the level difference between the M&A plants and the non-M&A
plants. Lastly, Column (5) breaks down the effect of a M&A on supplier switching
into individual years since the M&A. Column (5) suggests that supplier switching
can take place any time between the year of M&A to 4 years after the M&A, but
diminishes after 5 years of the M&A. As a robustness check, we repeat the exer-
cise with the outcome variable based on the three largest suppliers. The estimated
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coefficients (not reported in the paper) are similar to the coefficients in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Estimates of Supplier Switching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(M&A last 3 yrs) 0.036* 0.033 0.058*** 0.052**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022)
1(Yr of the M&A) 0.043
(0.031)
1(1 yr after M&A) 0.063*
(0.032)
1(2 yrs after M&A) 0.059*
(0.035)
1(3 yrs after M&A) 0.073*
(0.038)
1(4 yrs after M&A) 0.034
(0.035)
1(5 or more yrs after M&A) -0.007
(0.021)
Controls X X X X
Year FE X X
Division-Year FE X X X
Plant FE
R2 0.008 0.043 0.108 0.142 0.108
Total Plants 410 409 409 188 409
Obs. 7583 7578 7578 3498 7578
Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy indicator for a switch in the largest supplier from t− 1
to t. A set of control variables include a dummy for a coal type switch from bituminous coal in
time t− 1 to sub-bituminous coal in time t, nameplate capacity measured in megawatts, number of
combustion generators, number of steam generators, and average shipping distance of coal in time
t− 1. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level.
We then explore whether supplier switching is more likely if merging plants
are closer to the network being acquired. If plants that are closer to a merging net-
work switch their suppliers more than the plants that are distant from the merging
network, then it is more difficult to rule out an omitted variable bias from unob-
servable procurement conditions. For example, if unobservable shipping costs are
66
not an important factor in sourcing decisions, then plants with different distances
to a merging network should unilaterally switch their suppliers. However, we
find that plants with different distance respond differentially. Formally, we test
whether a plant’s distance to a merging network has a heterogeneous impact on
supplier switching. We regress supplier switching on a M&A dummy and a M&A
dummy interacted with the minimum distance to a merging network.
Table 2.5 show the estimation results. In Column (1), the negative coefficient
on the interaction term suggests that merging plants distant from the merging net-
work switch their suppliers at a lower rate than the merging plants closer to the
merging network. If division-specific trends are controlled for (i.e., Column 2), the
magnitude of the coefficient on the interacted term becomes smaller. However, it is
still negative and statistically different from 0, suggesting that procurement condi-
tions in a local market (smaller than the census division market) can be driving the
probability of switching. In Columns (3) and (4), a discrete measure of the M&A
distance is used: a dummy indicator for the plants with the above median value of
the shortest distance to a merging network. Column (3) uses the year effects and
Column (4) uses the division-year effects. Though the coefficient on the interaction
term becomes statistically insignificant in Column (4), a sizable point estimate still
suggests that unobservable market conditions are a threat to the identification.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of Supplier Switching: By Plant Distance to M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(M&A last 3 yrs) 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.072** 0.075***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028)
1(M&A last 3 yrs)· log(Min. dist.) -0.017** -0.012*
(0.007) (0.006)
1(M&A last 3 yrs)· 1(min. dist. above median) -0.078** -0.038
(0.039) (0.036)
Controls X X X X
Year FE X X
Division-Year FE X X
Plant FE
R2 0.044 0.108 0.044 0.108
Total Plants 409 409 409 409
Obs. 7578 7578 7578 7578
Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy indicator for a switch in the largest supplier from t− 1 to
t. log(Min. dist.) is the log of the shortest distance between a merging plant and any of the plants
in the network being acquired. 1(min. dist. above media) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the shortest distance to merging network is above the median. A set of control variables include a
dummy indicator for a coal type switch from bituminous coal in time t− 1 to sub-bituminous coal
in time t, nameplate capacity measured in megawatts, number of combustion generators, num-
ber of steam generators, and average shipping distance of coal in time t− 1. Standard errors are
clustered at the plant level.
2.3 Mergers & Sourcing Decisions
In this section, we estimate the impact of M&A’s on supplier consolidation. We
transform our data from a plant level to a plant-plant pair level and restrict our
sample to be pairs of closely located plants to establish causality. We first explain
why we shift to a pair level analysis. Naturally, whether or not plants combine or
consolidate their suppliers is a joint decision involving at least two entities. Uni-
entity or a plant level measures of supplier consolidation such as a number of
suppliers or a HHI measure can be misleading because the plant level measures do
not fully capture a plant’s supplier consolidation. For example, consider a plant
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that sources its coal from a single supplier. Now, the plant shifts its entire coal
demand to a different supplier which is already shipping to another plant owned
by the same parent company. Then, the two plants have combined or consolidated
their suppliers. However, from the original plant’s perspective, neither the number
of suppliers nor the HHI measure changes. In order to avoid this problem, we
transform the data from a plant-year level to a pair-year level unit of observation.
In the pair level data, measures of supplier consolidation are defined naturally.
We study whether a pair shares common suppliers and how much of coal is deliv-
ered from the common suppliers. In particular, we define the following variables:
1(Any Common) is a dummy indicator for whether a pair shares any common sup-
pliers, 1(L1 Common) is a dummy indicator for whether a pair shares the respec-
tive largest supplier as a common supplier, 1(L3 Common) is a dummy indicator
for whether a pair shares any of the three respective largest suppliers as a common
supplier, #(Total) is the total number of suppliers by a pair, HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of suppliers delivering to a pair, #(Common) is the number of
common suppliers shared by a pair, F Common is a fraction of the total coal quanti-
ties delivered by the common suppliers, F L1 Common is a fraction of the total coal
quantities delivered from the largest common supplier, and F L3 Common is a frac-
tion of the total coal quantities delivered from the three largest common suppliers.
We, then, test:
yit =α · 1(M&A yet)it + X′itβ + γi + γt + εit
where i denotes a pair of two plants, yit can be any of the afore-mentioned mea-
sures of supplier consolidation, 1(M&A yet)it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
pair i undergoes a M&A and t is a time period after a M&A, Xit measures similar-
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ities in the plant characteristics between the two plants of the pair i, γi denotes the
pair fixed effects and γt denotes the time fixed effects.
We remind the reader that testing whether M&A’s lead to supplier consolida-
tion suffers from two endogeneity problems. First is a selection bias that mergers
are not random but are choices by firms. We have argued that performance of any
particular pair of two plants from the merging firms is orthogonal to the firm-level
M&A decision. Another endogeneity problem is unobservable procurement envi-
ronment. We address the omitted variable bias more directly by looking at pairs of
plants in close proximity that share similar local market conditions. In particular,
we restrict the sample to the plant pairs with the pair distance less than 300km.
In a given census division, an average distance between any two random plants is
about 800km.
A pair level analysis is first implemented on the dummy measures of supplier
consolidation. Table 2.6 reports the estimation results. The outcome variables are
1(Any Common) in Columns (1) and (2), 1(L1 Common) in Columns (3) and (4),
and 1(L3 Common) in Columns (5) and (6). In the odd number columns, there is
no restriction on the pair distance. The even number columns restrict the sample
to be the pairs of plants that are within 300km. Across the odd number columns
compared to their even column counterparts, the coefficients are biased upwards.
The difference between the odd and the even columns suggests that restricting the
sample to be the pairs of closely located plants accounts for some of the local unob-
servables. In the even columns, the coefficients are stabilized and generally lower.
Nonetheless, the results still suggest that upon a M&A, plant pairs start sourc-
ing from common suppliers. In particular, the estimated coefficient in Column (2)
implies that upon a M&A, two merged plants is 15.4 pp more likely to share a com-
mon supplier. Since the fraction of pairs that share any common supplier is about
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66.8%, 7.7 pp translates into about a 23% effect. Columns (4) and (6) respectively
suggest that about 51% (0.079/0.154) and 97% (0.149/0.154) of the overall M&A
effect in Column (1) are due to pairs consolidating their largest supplier and any
of the three largest suppliers.
Table 2.6: Estimates of Supplier Consolidation
(1) 1(Common) (2) 1(Common) (3) 1(L1 Common) (4) 1(L1 Common) (5) 1(L3 Common) (6) 1(L3 Common)
1(M&A yet) 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.151*** 0.149***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019)
Base 0.550 0.668 0.269 0.338 0.449 0.571
Controls X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Pair FE X X X X X X
Pair Dist. 300 300 300
Frac. M&A Pairs 0.016 0.117 0.016 0.117 0.016 0.117
Total Pairs 85052 6194 85052 6194 85052 6194
R2 0.156 0.221 0.039 0.085 0.113 0.162
Obs. 1447742 102522 1447742 102522 1447742 102522
Notes: A set of control variables include percentage difference in nameplate capacity between the
two plants of a pair, percentage difference in the average shipping distance to coal, difference in
the number of combustion generators, difference in the number of steam generators and a dummy
indicator for whether two plants share a common coal type. Standard errors are clustered at the
plant level.
The estimation results are not sensitive to the choices of the pair distance thresh-
olds. Table 2.7 reports estimation results with different pair distance thresholds.
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Table 2.7: Estimates of Supplier Consolidation: Robustness
(1) 1(Common) (2) 1(Common) (3) 1(Common) (4) 1(L1 Common) (5) 1(L1 Common) (6) 1(L1 Common)
1(M&A yet) 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.173*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Base 0.652 0.668 0.707 0.329 0.338 0.359
Controls X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Pair FE X X X X X X
Pair Dist. 400 300 200 400 300 200
Frac. M&A Pairs 0.077 0.117 0.161 0.077 0.117 0.161
Total Pairs 10281 6194 3073 10281 6194 3073
R2 0.209 0.221 0.241 0.074 0.085 0.115
Obs. 170739 102522 51333 170739 102522 51333
Notes: A set of control variables include percentage difference in nameplate capacity between the
two plants of a pair, percentage difference in the average shipping distance to coal, difference in
the number of combustion generators, difference in the number of steam generators and a dummy
indicator for whether two plants share a common coal type. Standard errors are clustered at the
plant level.
Next, we look at the magnitude of supplier consolidation. The outcome vari-
ables are #(Total), #(Common), HHI, F Common, F L1 Common and F L3 Common.
Table 2.8 reports the estimation results with the 300km threshold. They suggest
that upon a M&A, a plant pair combines its supplier base in two different ways.
First, a plant pair can together find an entirely new common supplier. Second,
one of the plants of a pair can discontinue its relationships with the existing sup-
pliers and switch to the other plant’s suppliers. Yet, regardless of a consolidation
mechanism a plant pair employs, the results suggest that plant pairs increase their
dependence on the common suppliers.
The estimated coefficient in Column (1) shows that a merger induces a plant
pair to increase the total number of suppliers by 0.256 or about 4% compared to
the baseline count of 7. At first, this result seems to suggest that plant pairs are
expanding rather than consolidating their supplier base. However, Column (2) re-
veals that the number of common suppliers outgrows the number of total suppli-
ers. That is, even if one assumes that 0.256 out of the 0.591 increase in the number
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of common suppliers is from finding a new common supplier, there still is an in-
crease in the number of common suppliers by 0.335 (0.591-0.256). This suggests
that at least one of the plants of a pair replaces its existing suppliers with the other
plant’s suppliers. If there is no supplier consolidation (i.e., removing and combin-
ing suppliers), then an increase in the number of common suppliers can only arise
from increasing the number of entirely new common suppliers and thereby cannot
be greater than an increase in the number of total suppliers.
Yet, regardless of how plant pairs start to source from common suppliers, M&A’s
lead the plant pairs to increase their dependence on the common suppliers. While
Column (3) shows that HHI decreases upon a M&A —a consequence foreshad-
owed by the increase in the total number of suppliers—, the estimated coefficient
in Column (4) reveals that the fraction of coal delivered from the common suppli-
ers increases by 0.071 pp or by 47% from the baseline fraction of 0.15. Columns
(5) and (6) show that about 39% (0.028/0.071) and 80% (0.057/0.071) of the overall
increase in the fraction is attributed to the largest and the three largest suppliers,
respectively.
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Table 2.8: Estimates of Supplier Consolidation: Continuous Measures
(1) #(Total) (2) #(Common) (3) HHI (4) F Common (5) F L1 Common (6) F L3 Common
1(M&A yet) 0.256** 0.591*** -157.391** 0.071*** 0.028*** 0.057***
(0.125) (0.075) (69.468) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Base 7.002 1.179 5277.295 0.150 0.053 0.118
Controls X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Pair FE X X X X X X
Pair Dist. 300 300 300 300 300 300
Frac. M&A Pairs 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117
Total Pairs 6194 6194 6194 6194 6194 6194
R2 0.527 0.268 0.550 0.200 0.109 0.176
Obs. 102522 102522 102522 102522 102522 102522
Notes: A set of control variables include percentage difference in nameplate capacity between the
two plants of a pair, percentage difference in the average shipping distance to coal, difference in
the number of combustion generators, difference in the number of steam generators and a dummy
indicator for whether two plants share a common coal type. Standard errors are clustered at the
plant level.
2.4 Conclusions and Future Research
Using the unique transaction data between coal-fired power plants and coal sup-
pliers in the U.S., this paper provides the first empirical evidence on whether
mergers induce firms to consolidate their supplier base. Specifically, we find that
merged plant pairs become about 23% more likely to share suppliers. About a half
of the effect arises from consolidating the largest supplier. We also find that upon
a M&A, plant pairs receive a greater fraction of coal from the common suppliers.
The share of coal delivered by the common suppliers increases by 47%.
However, our results compel more careful analysis to follow. One immediate
worry is that while we argue that a particular plant pair is less likely to be instru-
mental to a firm level M&A decision, a selection bias can indeed persist at the pair
level. First, certain plants may be the crown and jewels of mergers. Also, if each
of the merging firms is very closely clustered to the extent that differences (e.g.,
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distance) in any random pairs of the merging firms are minimal, then a firm-level
merger is effectively a pair-level merger. Future analysis can address this issue
by matching merging plant pairs to non-merging plant pairs that are hypotheti-
cally more likely to merge (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003). Another issue with the
regression analysis in this paper is that for the plant pairs that undergo multiple
M&A’s, the first M&A is assumed to capture all the potential impact of subsequent
M&A’s on supplier consolidation. Given that about a quarter of plants that are
ever a part of a M&A goes through multiple M&A’s, our analysis is likely to be
biased upwards. Yet, one can estimate a M&A-specific effect by interacting the
M&A term with a dummy indicator for individual M&A’s. Then, the effects of
multiple M&A’s can be separately identified. Lastly, future research should also
explore the impact of a M&A on negotiated prices between power producers and
coal suppliers. Increased bargaining leverage from supplier consolidation should
obtain lower rates for the power companies, at least in theory. Empirical estima-
tion of the magnitude of the price discounts from supplier consolidation will add
a dialogue to a controversial idea in antitrust policies that downstream mergers
should be permitted to counterbalance the upstream market power.42
42Thomassen et al. (forthcoming) discusses that while mergers would increase the market power
of supermarkets, they can also help the supermarkets negotiate better prices with wholesalers or
manufacturers.
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Appendix
A.1 Institutional Overview
A.1.1 Regulatory Structure and Power Producer Typology
Historically, the US power industry has been regulated on the federal and the state
level. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates interstate
transmission and wholesale power sales, while the Public Utility Commissions or
Public Service Comissions (PUCs/PSCs) are the regulatory authorities overlook-
ing retail sales of electricity, construction of transmission lines within their bound-
aries, and intrastate distribution.
In the 1990’s, the federal government started restructuring the wholesale elec-
tricity market by unbundling generation from transmission and distribution. In
1992, the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) oversaw a radical overhaul to the industry
structure. The FERC issued Order No. 636, known as the Restructuring Rule,
which mandated open access to transmission system and separation of electricity
sales from transportation services. Although the implementation of the EPACT
was up to state’s discretion, a number of states started restructuring its regional
electricity market. The FERC further promoted competition through a consequent
series of orders; it mandated non-discriminatory pricing and access to transmis-
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sion services –Order No.888 in 1996–, and established definitions of voluntary,
non-profit organizations –Order No. 2000 in 1999– that would manage the whole-
sale electricity markets. These entities called Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs) have taken more roles over time;
they provide an fair access to the regional transmission infrastructure and serve as
a wholesale market in which buyers and sellers could bid for or offer generation.
As of 2014, 7 RTOs/ISOs serve about roughly two-thirds of transmission in the U.S.
The rest of electricity is served in the traditional market where vertically integrated
utilities are usually responsible for both generation and transmission.
In the late 90’s as the electricity industry was restructured, non-utilities started
to grow. Unlike the traditional utilities who were responsible for generation, trans-
mission and distribution, the non-utilities focused only on generation. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA) classifies non-utilities into 3 types: Independent
Power Producers (IPPs), commercial and industrial non-utilities. While the last
two non-utilities produce electricity primarily for their own use, an IPP operates
merchant power plants and sells electricity on the wholesale market or via power
purchase agreements.
A regulated electric utility, by contrast, operates power plants subject to a rate-
of-return regulation and directly serves customers within its service territory. A
PUC determines an allowed return on capital for each utility during a rate hear-
ing, and the utility sets its retail electricity prices accordingly. Rate hearings are
often costly and hence held intermittently. In the past, this implied that the power
utilities were vulnerable to risks from volatile changes in the fuel prices because
retail price adjustments were inflexible. By 1979, as most of the PUCs adopted the
Fuel Adjustment Clauses (FAC), the utilities were able to pass through the changes
in fuel costs directly on to the consumer without the need of a rate hearing (Knit-
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tel, Metaxoglou and Trindade, 2014). However, the FACs also created the disin-
centives as the utilities did not have to bear the burden from excessive fuel use
(Brown, Einhorn and Vogelsang, 1991). Since then, the PUCs have modified the
FACs overtime such that the firms absorb a portion of fuel cost overruns, as well
as profit from lower than expected fuel costs (Knittel, 2002b). Currently, most of
states have the FAC such that it becomes effective only when the fuel costs surge
above or fall below certain thresholds. In such case, the utilities become the resid-
ual claimant to reductions in input costs up to the automatic adjustment threshold
(Joskow, 1974).
A.1.2 Environmental Policies
In the 2000’s, federal regulation has focused on setting tighter environmental stan-
dards. In 2000, under the Clean Air Act from 1990, the Acid Rain Program (ARP)
went into the Phase II, which tightened the annual SO2 and NOX emissions limits
imposed on the Phase I plants and also set restrictions on smaller, cleaner plants
fired by coal, oil, and gas. The program affected existing utility units serving gen-
erators with an output capacity of greater than 25 megawatts and all new utility
units (EPA, 2012a). To accomplish the emissions reductions, the ARP introduced
an allowance trading system.
In 2005, the EPA issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). The rule was
set to reduce SO2 and NOX by 70%. The CAIR covered 27 eastern states and the
District of Columbia, and the states were to comply by “(1) meeting the state’s
emission budget by requiring power plants to participate in an EPA-administered
interstate cap and trade system that caps emissions in two stages, or (2) meeting an
individual state emissions budget through measures of the state’s choosing” (EPA,
2014). The D.C Court vacated the CAIR in 2008 but ordered to hold the CAIR in
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place until the EPA establishes a replacement.
Seasonal emission programs started well before 2000. In the 2000’s, these pro-
grams further tightened the emission standards. In 2003, the NOX Budget Trading
Program under the NOX State Implementation Plan (NOX SIP) superseded the
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOX Budget Program. In 2009, CAIR’s NOx
ozone season program under Clean Air Interstate Rule began, effectively replac-
ing the NOX Budget Trading Program and achieving further summertime NOx
reductions from the power sector. These seasonal NOX programs have targeted 20
Eastern states between May and September of each year (EPA, 2012b).
These new environmental policies have impacted the use of coal relatively more
than that of natural gas. Historically, in the absence of environmental regulation,
coal has been a favored fuel source due to its low relative price. Power producers
burn natural gas “as a cleaner-burning fuel in preference to other fossil fuels, to
comply with environmental regulations” (Tuthill, 2008).
A.1.3 Background on Coal and Natural Gas Generation
Coal and natural gas have distinctive characteristics that make one commodity
more attractive than the other depending on generation technology, cycling costs43,
associated environmental pollution, and the relative outlook of the future fuel
prices.
On a generator level, a fuel choice is limited by generator types and cycling
costs. There are two major types of generators: steam turbine and combustion tur-
bine.44 While a steam generator can be operated on any fuel and is often more effi-
43Costs associated with ramping up and down power plants
44Steam turbine: a device that converts high-pressure steam, produced in a boiler, into mechani-
cal energy that can then be used to produce electricity by forcing blades in a cylinder to rotate and
turn a generator shaft. Combustion turbine: an internal combustion engine has one or more cylin-
ders in which the process of combustion takes place, converting energy released from the rapid
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cient than a combustion generator, it is associated with more cycling costs. Mean-
while, the combustion turbines are used specifically for natural gas and have low
cycling costs. But, they are less efficient. Hence, natural gas power plants are typ-
ically operated to meet peak electricity demand while power plants with steam
turbines –mostly use coal because of its cheap relative price compared to other fu-
els– are operated on a continuous basis to serve base load demand.(Dahl and Ko,
2001; Hinrichs and Kleinbach, 2002) Normally, demand load tends to be lowest at
night, when most people are asleep, and highest during the day, when most elec-
tric appliances are in use. Utilities meet this load by operating a selected subset of
all the generators calculated to be the most efficient for the season and time (EIA,
2012).
In the era of heavy environmental regulation and shale gas boom, natural gas
has an advantage over coal for power generation. Burning natural gas results in
much fewer emissions of nearly all types of air pollutants and carbon dioxide per
unit of heat produced than coal.45 Natural gas is also becoming more abundant
as recent shale gas development has accelerated with the new applications of hy-
draulic fracturing technology and horizontal drilling. The total national gas pro-
duction grew over 25% from 2006 to 2012. Although it is unclear how much the
decrease in the energy demand from the 2008 recession affected the natural gas
prices, the increased natural gas supply has been identified as one of the major con-
tributor to the lower gas prices since 2008 (EIA, 2014). Delivered coal costs to the
electric sector are on an increasing trend due to the growing fuel surcharges added
by transportation companies.(EIA, 2013a; Knittel, Metaxoglou and Trindade, 2014)
Figure 2.4.1 shows that the relative price of natural gas to coal is on a decreasing
burning of a fuel-air mixture into mechanical energy. Source: EIA glossary
45About 117 pounds of carbon dioxide are produced per million Btu equivalent of natural gas
compared to over 200 pounds of CO2 per million Btu of coal (EIA, 2013b).
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trend since 2005.
Figure 2.4.1: Trends in Fuel Prices
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However, despite the price advantage of natural gas, utilities are often stuck
with burning coal due to long-term coal contracts. Joskow (1987b) and Cicala
(2015) document that “the market for coal is largely conducted through long-term
bilateral contracts.” A typical contract lasts from a few months to several years,
and firms are locked in with coal until contracts expire.
A.2 Data
A.2.1 Data Sources
Most of the data analyzed in this dissertation are from the Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EIA-423/923
(previously collected as FERC-423, EIA-906/920) forms provide data on generation
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and fuel transaction. The plants responsible for reporting are those with generat-
ing capacity of 50 MW or more. Form EIA-860 provides generator-level specific
information about existing and planned generators and associated environmental
equipment at electric power plants with 1 megawatt or greater of combined name-
plate capacity. Starting in 2010, the EIA 860 provides information whether a plant
is a member of the wholesale market. For the earlier years, I extrapolate the 2010
status; if a plant is connected to an ISO/RTO in 2010, it is assumed that the plant
has been since 2001.
The EPA’s Air Markets Program Data provides generator-level information about
the environmental programs. The programs include the Acid Rain Program, the
Clean Air Interstate Rule program, and the various ozone programs like the OTC
Program, the NOX Budget Program and the SIP NOX Program. This data is pro-
vided on an annual level.
The Form EIA-826, “Monthly Electric Utility Sales and Revenue Report with
State Distributions,” provides data on retail sales of electricity and associated rev-
enue, each month, from a statistically chosen sample of electric utilities in the
United States. The state-level retail electricity price data is obtained from the EIA
826. The state-level regulatory status data are hand collected from the EIA’s web-
site. If a state has implemented restructuring in many steps, I consider the first
month of the implementation as the restructured date. The spot price data and the
weather data are obtained from Bloomberg. The state-level GDP per capita and
the state-level unemployment rates are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis and Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively.
When all the above data are merged, a good number of mismatches exist. There
are 2 main sources of the mismatches. First, the fuel consumption data is collected
for the plants with the capacity 50 MW or more. Hence, in this paper I limit the
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scope of analysis to these plants. Second, prior to 2008 when the FERC collected
the fuel receipt and cost data, it issued waivers to the filing requirements to some
plants who met certain criteria, and as a result a significant number of plants either
did not submit fossil fuel receipts data or submitted partial information.46 After
2008, the EIA 923’s monthly data do not survey all the plants that meet the 50 MW
requirement. However, according to the EIA, the monthly sample represents most
of the total net generation at approximately 94%. I imputed the missing prices us-
ing flexible interactions between the spot prices and the plant-level characteristics.
The R-squared for the imputation regressions are over 0.9 for both natural gas and
coal. However, missing price data for non-utilities are not imputed. EIA regards
the entire price data for non-utilites as business sensitive and do not release the
data for public use.
Other data sources include S&P Global Platts, and SDC Platinum. Platts database
provides information on the transactions between power plants and suppliers.
SDC Platinum databse provides information on the ownership structure of power
plants. Various SEC 10-k filing reports are used to supplement the ownership data.
In a case that a power plant is owned by multiple entities, the major stake holder
is assumed to be the parent company.
A.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 report various statistics of the power plant characteris-
tics and the state-level market characteristics. Variables defnitions are: Utility is
the regulated utility sector. IPP represents the non-regulated independent power
producers. Ind/Com is the industrial or the commercial sector. Coal is the coal de-
46Look at Appendix C, Technical Notes, to the Electric Power Monthly for further details. (http:
//www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/technotes.pdf)
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manded in billion British thermal unit (Btu). NG is the natural gas demanded in
billion Btu. Coal Units is the proportion of coal plants/operators in the sector. NG
Units is the proportion of natural gas plants/operators in the sector. Dual Units
is the proportion of dual-fuel plants/operators in the sector. Nb. Tot. Gen. is the
overall number of generators by a plant/operator. Nb. CT. Gen. is the number of
combustion generators. Nb. ST. Gen. is the number of steam generators. Capacity
is the nameplate capacity in Megawatts. Age/Avg.Age is the age (average age) of a
plant (operator). Nb. Entities is the total number of plants/operators in the sector.
Nb. Plants is the number of plants owned by a operator. Nb. CHP is the number
of combined heat plants. Nb. SO2 Cntrl is the number of plants with a SO2 scrub-
ber. Nb. NOx Cntrl is the number of plants with a NOx scrubber. Nb. Season NOx
is the number of plants with a Particle Matter scrubber. Nb. ARP is the number
of plants under the Acid Rain Program. Nb. CAIR NOx is the number of plants
under the CAIR NOx program. Nb. CAIR SO2 is the number of plants under the
CAIR SO2 program. Nb. Season NOx is the number of plants under the seasonal
NOx program: OTC, NBP, and CAIR OS. ISO is the number of plants connected
to a ISO/RTO. Regional division is based on the Census region. Deregulation is a
dummy whether the state has restructured the electricity market. Capita GDP is
GDP per capita in thousand dollars. Unemp. Rate is the unemployment rate. Retail
Electricity Price is cents per kWh. Heating Degree Days is the monthly sum of 65
Fahrenheit minus the average daily temperature. If 65F minus the average daily
temperature is negative, HDD is 0 for that day. Cooling Degree Days is the monthly
sum of the average daily temperature minus 65 Fahrenheit. If the day’s average
minus 65F is negative, CDD is 0 for that day. Mean Temperature is the monthly
average of the day’s mean temperature. Relative Humidity is the monthly mean of
the ratio of the partial pressure of water vapor to the saturated vapor pressure of
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water at a given temperature.
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics on Plant Characteristics
Plant Level Operator Level
Utility IPP Ind/Com Overall Utility IPP Ind/Com Overall
Coal (Bn Btu) 3507.1 2459.7 268.5 2524.7 6856.1 3517.8 292.1 3902.4
(3958.4) (3464.9) (475.6) (3605.3) (9424.5) (6128.0) (512.2) (7468.1)
NG (Bn Btu) 241.0 470.9 174.3 294.7 443.2 606.7 190.4 412.2
(878.9) (937.5) (1339.8) (1045.1) (2128.4) (1137.2) (1414.0) (1614.5)
Coal Units 0.162 0.0876 0.0634 0.115 0.0718 0.0681 0.0608 0.0668
(0.369) (0.283) (0.244) (0.319) (0.258) (0.252) (0.239) (0.250)
NG Units 0.677 0.818 0.755 0.739 0.663 0.832 0.754 0.751
(0.468) (0.386) (0.430) (0.439) (0.473) (0.373) (0.431) (0.432)
Dual Units 0.161 0.0945 0.181 0.146 0.265 0.0995 0.186 0.182
(0.367) (0.293) (0.385) (0.353) (0.441) (0.299) (0.389) (0.386)
Nb. Tot. Gen. 3.502 3.147 2.591 3.167 7.136 4.141 2.838 4.671
(2.624) (2.676) (1.966) (2.519) (9.649) (5.237) (2.668) (6.711)
Nb. CT. Gen. 2.156 1.994 1.248 1.879 4.393 2.623 1.367 2.772
(2.644) (2.705) (1.789) (2.505) (5.909) (4.250) (2.364) (4.564)
Nb. ST. Gen. 1.345 1.119 1.333 1.274 2.739 1.473 1.460 1.879
(1.618) (1.165) (1.681) (1.517) (5.031) (2.258) (1.903) (3.392)
Capacity 406.0 410.5 44.76 316.6 827.2 540.1 49.03 467.0
(605.1) (504.1) (90.86) (517.0) (1984.8) (958.5) (109.8) (1301.4)
Age / Avg. Age 34.85 18.53 28.78 28.41 37.73 16.06 28.85 27.41
(18.71) (15.82) (18.73) (19.19) (16.82) (14.24) (18.57) (18.85)
Nb. Entities 1370 992 871 1130.8 583 731 758 692.2
(0) (0) (0) (219.9) (0) (0) (0) (76.40)
Nb. Plants 2.037 1.316 1.095 1.475
(2.140) (1.098) (0.618) (1.476)
Nb. CHP 0.00225 0.416 0.972 0.470
(0.0474) (0.655) (0.674) (0.676)
Nb. SO2 Cntrl 0.230 0.0931 0.0185 0.112
(0.623) (0.351) (0.135) (0.426)
Nb. NOx Cntrl 0.976 0.832 0.0872 0.627
(1.758) (0.978) (0.286) (1.227)
Nb. PM Cntrl 0.615 0.215 0.0546 0.290
(1.357) (0.634) (0.227) (0.897)
Nb. ARP 1.198 0.796 0.0165 0.663
(2.027) (1.015) (0.127) (1.387)
Nb. CAIR NOx 0.354 0.278 0.00793 0.211
(1.360) (0.733) (0.0887) (0.897)
Nb. CAIR SO2 0.279 0.218 0.00613 0.166
(1.211) (0.649) (0.0780) (0.796)
Nb. Season NOx 0.199 0.219 0.0418 0.153
(1.026) (0.653) (0.203) (0.711)
Nb. ISO/RTO 0.984 0.917 0.684 0.860
(1.807) (0.991) (0.794) (1.273)
N 349387 236871
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics on State Characteristics
East Midwest South West
mean/sd min max mean/sd min max mean/sd min max mean/sd min max
Deregulation 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
(0.49) (0.42) (0.45) (0.40)
Capita GDP (’000 $) 43.51 23.77 67.66 42.78 30.27 70.77 42.12 24.34 66.13 43.63 25.65 80.00
(10.48) (6.15) (9.26) (9.72)
Unemp. Rate 6.18 2.70 12.80 5.63 1.90 14.80 5.99 2.60 12.50 6.23 2.10 14.10
(2.08) (2.16) (2.03) (2.42)
Retail Electricity Price 10.79 3.90 20.17 7.25 4.77 12.15 7.93 4.43 14.12 7.53 3.78 15.51
(3.37) (1.30) (1.90) (2.08)
Heating Degree Days 14.85 0.00 55.56 17.77 0.00 60.80 8.51 0.00 40.15 15.19 0.00 52.10
(13.77) (16.01) (9.63) (12.90)
Cooling Degree Days 2.73 0.00 19.61 2.46 0.00 21.40 5.45 0.00 25.43 2.60 0.00 23.06
(4.22) (3.89) (6.14) (4.38)
Mean Temperature 52.89 9.44 84.61 49.69 4.20 86.40 61.95 24.85 90.43 52.00 12.90 86.38
(16.80) (18.78) (14.66) (15.85)
Relative Humidity 69.22 50.08 83.05 68.78 40.49 86.29 67.88 42.73 85.22 53.17 14.20 87.56
(5.49) (6.86) (6.14) (15.60)
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